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LICENSURE OF PHYSICIANS
EDWARD H. FORGOTSON*
RUTH ROEMERt
ROGER W. NEWMANt
I. MEDICAL AND SURGICAL PHYSICIANS
Medical licensure laws were originally enacted in the United States dur-
ing the late 19th and early 20th centuries as a matter of public necessity.'
Protecting the public against quackery, commercial exploitation, decep-
tion, and professional incompetence required legally enforceable standards
for entrance into and continuation in the medical profession. The states'
medical practice acts therefore specified both ethical and educational re-
quirements for physicians--requirements relating to personal character,
scientific education, and practical training or experience.
The early licensure statutes reflected the recommendations of the Flex-
ner Report on medical education published in 1910. This report initiated
efforts to raise standards of medical school admission, instruction, and
curriculum, to place these schools under the jurisdiction of universities,
and to provide full-time faculty and adequate facilities for teaching and
clinical experience.2 The incorporation in medical licensure laws of re-
quirements which proprietary schools could not meet resulted in the closing
of "diploma mills," as the inadequate medical schools of the time were
called. Standards of ethics and competency in the early licensure laws
reflected the view of leaders of the medical profession that "medicine should
be based on an educational system that was responsive to the needs and
the social and scientific status of the country at that time."3
Although vast changes have taken place in the "social and scientific
status of the country" since the original enactment of the medical practice
acts, no fundamental changes have been made in the statutory standards
of professional competence and ethical behavior. In investigating the ade-
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quacy of current licensure laws to meet modem scientific and social con-
ditions, this article examines the most significant features of state medical
licensure laws: the scope of mandatory licensure, including the important
question of authority for delegations of functions; the nature and role of
state licensing agencies; qualifications for licensure candidates, including
accreditation of medical schools; license registration and renewal, and re-
instatement of lapsed licenses; recognition of licenses of other jurisdictions;
and license suspension or revocation, and reinstatement of removed li-
censes.
A. Mandatory Licensure
1. Definitions, Scope, and Effect
In all states licensure of physicians is mandatory; therefore, it is nec-
essary for the statutes to define the medical practice from which unlicensed
persons are excluded. Although the language of statutory definitions varies
considerably, the practice of medicine is universally defined in broad terms
which encompass all health service functions.' A person who in any way
4. Some representative statutory definitions of the practice of medicine include:
Any person shall be regarded as practicing medicine and surgery who shall ad-
vertise in any manner, or hold himself or herself out to the public, as a physician
and surgeon, or either, or who shall investigate, diagnose or treat, or offer to in-
vestigate, diagnose or treat, a physical or mental ailment or disease, real or imag-
ined, or any person with a view to relieving the same, as is commonly done by
physicians and surgeons, or suggest, recommend, prescribe or direct for the use
of any person, sick, injured or deformed, any drug, medicine, device or appliance
for the intended relief, palliation or cure of the same, or who shall suggest, recom-
mend, prescribe or direct an operation on any such sick, injured or deformed
person or who shall perform, or offer to perform, any such operation whether or
not such person receives therefor, either directly or indirectly, any fee, gift or
compensation of any kind whatsoever or any manner whatsoever. IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 54-1802 (1947).
No person shall, in connection with the practice of medicine, surgery, osteopathy,
optometry, dentistry, chiropody, pharmacy, chiropractic, psychology or psychiatry,
nursing, anesthesiology, physio or physical therapy, or any other profession or
business having for its purpose the diagnosis, treatment, correction or cure of any
human ailment, condition, disease, injury or infirmity, hold himself out as a doctor
or employ or use in any manner the title "Doctor" or "Dr.," unless he actually
has graduated and holds a doctor degree from a school, college, university or in-
stitution authorized by its governing body to confer such degree. Ky. Rnv. STAT.
ANN. § 311.375 (1963).
A person practices medicine within the meaning of this article, except as herein-
after stated, who holds himself out as being able to diagnose, treat, operate or
prescribe for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical condition,
and who shall either offer or undertake, by any means or method, to diagnose,
treat, operate or prescribe for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity, or
physical condition. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6501 (McKinney 1953).
The other statutory definitions of the practice of medicine are found in: ALA. CODE
tit. 46, § 262 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 08.64.380 (1962); Auz. REv. STAT. ANN. §
32-1402 (1956); ARm. STAT. ANN. § 72-604 (1957); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2137
(1960); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-1-6 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. Rnv. § 20-9
(1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1731 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 458.13
(1962); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-901 (1955); HAWAiw Rav. LAWS § 64-1 (1955); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 16i (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-13 (1962);
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performs, offers to perform, or holds himself out to the public as perform-
ing specific functions-e.g., diagnosing, treating, operating, or prescribing
for a disease, ailment, pain, or condition-must be licensed as a physician.
In addition, almost half of the statutes specifically prohibit the unlicensed
use of certain medical titles and degrees. A few definitions are qualified
by a requirement that proscribed activities must be performed for com-
pensation.
All medical practice acts provide certain exemptions from the require-
ment of state licensure.' Exempt categories differ among the jurisdictions,
IOWA CODE ANN. § 148.1 (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2802 (1963); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 1261 (1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3251 (1964);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 139 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 (1965) (the
Mass. Statutes contain no specific definition of the practice of medicine); MicH. STAT.
ANN. § 14.537 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 147.10 (1945); MIss. CODE ANN. § 8888
(1956); Mo. REv. STAT. § 334.010 (1959); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 66-1007
(1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-1,102 (1966); NEV. REv. STAT. § 630.020 (1963);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 329:1 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-5.1 (1963); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 67-5-10 (1961); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-18 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 43-17-01 (1960); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.34 (Page 1953); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 59, § 492 (1963); ORE. REV. STAT. § 677.030 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§§ 401, 401A (1959); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37-1 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1354
(1962); S.D. CODE § 27.0310 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-608 (1955); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4510 (1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-17 (1963); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 1311 (1967); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-273,-275 (1967); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 18.71.010 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-3-2 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 147.01 (1957); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 33-327 (1959).
5. ALA. CODE tit. 46, §§ 268, 269, 295 (1958); ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.64.365,
08.64.370 (1962); ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 332.1421 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
72-604(2) (1957); CALIF. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2137.1-2147.6 (1960); CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 91-1-6(3) (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 20-9 (1958); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 24, §§ 1731(c), 1742 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-133,-134 (1966);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.13 (1962); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-906 (1955); HAWAII REV.
LAWS ch. 64, § 2 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 54-1802,-1807,-1813,-1816
(1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, §§ 16f, 16v (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 63-1310, 1311 (1962); IOWA CODE ANN. § 148.2 (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-2872 (1963); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.550(8), 311.560 (1963); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 1290 (1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 3260, 3751
(1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ 139, 140 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
112, § 7 (1965); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.538 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 147.09
(1945); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 8887, 8888 (1956); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 334.150, 334.155
(1959); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 66-1006,-1007 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 71-1,103 (1966); NEV. REV. STAT. § 630.360 (1963); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
329:21 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9.21 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-5-10
(1961); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6512 (McKinney 1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-18,
-19 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 43-17-02 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4731.36 (Page 1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 492 (1963); ORE. REV. STAT. §
677.060 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 409 (1959); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-37-14,
-15 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-1355,-1357 (1962); S.D. CODE § 27.0311
(1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-608 (1955); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 4504 (1966);
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but those provided by at least half of the states are as follows: (1) com-
missioned officers of the federal military services, the U.S. Public Health
Service, and physicians employed by federal civilian agencies, while per-
forming official medical duties;' (2) religious practitioners, including those
of Christian Science; (3) licensed practitioners of other health services;
(4) practitioners licensed in other states when in consultation with a state
licensed physician; (5) persons rendering emergency services, or dispens-
ing domestic remedies; and (6) medical students, interns, and residents.
The rationale of these and most other exceptions to mandatory licensure
is that the exempt categories consist of practitioners whose qualifications
are otherwise assured, and/or who are performing beneficial service under
circumstances which do not involve undue danger to the public. Exemp-
tions which meet the standard implicit in the rationale may be recom-
mended for wider adoption by the state legislatures, and the standard itself
may be a useful guide for state officials charged with enforcement of med-
ical practice acts.
In the past, questions concerning unauthorized and illegal practice of
medicine have arisen principally in connection with non-scientific healers."
Since the main purpose of medical licensure laws is to protect the public
against incompetence, quackery, and unscientific principles in the practice
of medicine, these statutes have served to block fraudulent and deceptive
activities of non-scientific healers. Today, well established policing methods,
improved public education, the joint efforts of federal and state govern-
ments, and the medical profession have brought this problem under rea-
sonable control.8 Future protection against non-scientific healers depends
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-17 (1963); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1312, 1313 (1967;
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-274,-276.7 (1967); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 18.71.030,
18.71.095 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-3-2 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 147.19
(1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 33-341 (1959).
6. The Attorney General of Wisconsin has recently ruled that a physician employed
by a Veterans Administration hospital does not have to be licensed by Wisconsin for his
service within the federal hospital, but he must be licensed by the state in order to
participate in a rotating training program cooperatively conducted by the V.A. hospital
and a non-federal hospital. However, requirements for appointment to the V.A. as-
sured that the physician would qualify for a temporary educational certificate of li-
censure by reciprocity. Wis. Op. ArTV GEN. (Aug. 31, 1966).
7. Cases involving the illegal practice of medicine by non-scientific practitioners
are legion; e.g., Beck v. Cooper, 147 Kan. 710, 78 P.2d 844 (1938); People v. Hick-ey,
157 Misc. 592, 283 N.Y.S. 968 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1935), aff'd, 249 App. Div. 611, 292
N.Y.S. 968 (1936), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 559, 20 N.E.2d 14 (1939).
8. For reviews of these efforts, see reports of the A.M.A. Congresses on Quackery,
the most recent of which was held in 1966.
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upon continued vigilance in the enforcement of existing legal sanctions,
and, in most states, upon re-examination of the legal status of chiroprac-
tors.'
2. Delegation of Functions
The most significant contemporary questions arising from mandatory
licensure for the practice of medicine concern the delegation of functions
by physicians to other health personnel. As previously noted," the statu-
tory definitions of medical practice give physicians an unlimited license
to perform all functions of health service, even those for which other health
personnel may also be licensed." However, the concomitant licensing of al-
lied and ancillary personnel indicates that the statutes do not contemplate
all health service to be conducted by physicians-a situation which would,
of course, be impossible to realize with the present or even projected supply
of physicians. Indeed, health authorities now generally agree that the
serious shortage of physicians can be overcome only by allocating certain
tasks not requiring the judgment and ability of a physician to specialized
personnel with fewer skills and less education." The need for such ex-
pansion of the professional productivity of physicians seems certain to con-
tinue, and even increase, over time. As medicine develops new methods of
treatment requiring specialized skills, new functions must be authorized
for existing health personnel, and new kinds of auxiliary personnel must
be specifically created.
What is the legal basis for these innovations? For example, do the med-
ical and nursing practice acts permit specifically trained nurses, under
standing orders from a physician, to administer cardiopulmonary resusci-
ation by means of a Pacemaker machine to patients suffering heart stop-
pages?" For most jurisdictions there can be no certain answers to such
questions because legal authorities have not yet resolved the underlying
issues. In a few states, however, the answers have begun to emerge from
court decisions, attorney general opinions, or legislative enactments. These
9. For legal regulation of chiropractors and other non-scientific practitioners, see
pt. III infra.
10. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
11. Licensed physicians may even provide dental service, and several dental practice
acts specifically exempt physicians from their application; e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 84-723
(1955); TEx REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4551b(4) (1960).
12. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON COMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICES, HEALTH Is A Com-
MUNITY AFFAm 77-100, 211-15 (1966).
13. For an account of the use and benefits of this practice in Standish, Michigan, see
L.A. Times, Nov. 24, 1966, § V, at 3, col. 8.
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initial efforts clearly indicate that the legality of delegations of medical
functions involves not only mandatory licensure for the practice of med-
icine, as statutorily defined, but also the scope and effect to be given to
(1) licenses of allied and auxiliary personnel, (2) prevailing customs of
medical practitioners and institutions, and (3) physicians' supervision and
control of assisting personnel.
In most states the only official guidelines for delegation are the func-
tional definitions of allied and auxiliary personnel in statutes which pro-
vide for their licensure. But these definitions are often difficult to interpret
and apply to new or unforeseen situations-hence the many advisory opin-
ions of state attorneys general on the scope of these licenses. Faced with
such uncertainties, the medical and nursing professions have recently
adopted interprofessional agreements to clarify accepted customs and prac-
tices. As a practical matter, delegation of health service functions is pre-
dominantly governed by prevailing custom and practice. In the few rele-
vant court decisions, however, it has been held that professional custom
is no defense for a contravention of licensure statutes. 4 Thus, in the ma-
jority of states, the authority of nurses, medical and surgical technicians,
physicians' assistants, and other personnel to undertake new functions and
to relieve physicians of certain tasks is limited by licensure statutes or is,
at best, an open question. Also uncertain are the character and degree of
medical supervision required to make such delegations of functions legit-
imate.
Two California cases illustrate the courts' handling of elements of li-
censure, custom, and supervision in deciding delegation questions. The
more recent case, People v. Whittaker,' involved the right of a neurosur-
geon to use a trained surgical assistant to assist in brain surgery. The as-
sistant was charged with practicing medicine without a license because he
operated a cranial drill and Giegle saw, positioned by the surgeon, to bore
holes and excise skull flaps during neurosurgical operations-even though
he was always within sight and under direct supervision of the surgeon.
The surgeon was charged with aiding and abetting an unlicensed person
to practice medicine. The jury found both parties guilty of the charges.
As a standard for judging the physician's use of an unlicensed trained as-
sistant, working under direct supervision, the following instruction was given
to the jury: 16
14. Barber v. Reinking, 68 Wash. 2d 122, 411 P.2d 861 (1966).
15. No. 35307, Justice Court of Redding Judicial District (Shasta County, Cal.,
Dec. 1966).
16. Record at 861. People v. Whittaker, No. 35307, Justice Court of Redding Ju-
dicial District (Shasta County, Cal., Dec. 1966).
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In determining whether acts in this case, if any, performed under the
direct supervision and control of a duly licensed physician, were legal
or illegal, you may consider evidence of custom and usage of the med-
ical practice in California as shown by the evidence in this case.
The Whittaker judgment has been appealed because of its importance
as a test of the right of a physician or surgeon to use an "extra pair of
hands" under conditions not constituting a medical emergency. Regardless
of the outcome of the appeal,"7 the case is significant for its allowance of
prevailing "custom and usage of the medical practice" in the state to de-
termine the propriety of a physician's delegation and supervision of patently
medical, but essentially mechanical, functions. Although this standard may
seem both sensible and workable, it nevertheless illustrates the difficulties
inherent in the court's attempt, on a case-by-case basis, to clarify policies
and promulgate standards. Legal regulation developed through jury de-
terminations of medical custom and usage may produce inconsistencies
and uncertainties in the law, may impede innovations in health service, and
finally, may not provide adequate assurance of patient safety. 8 In addi-
tion, to rely upon medical custom and usage is to abdicate responsibility
for the development of legal criteria governing the delegation of medical
functions.
In an earlier California case, Magit v. Board of Medical Examiners,9
a physician's California license had been revoked for "unprofessional con-
duct" because he hired unlicensed, foreign-trained anesthesiologists for
independent administration of anesthetics in a hospital. In affirming the
Board's revocation, the California Supreme Court noted that professional
nurses might administer general anesthetics under an exception to the med-
ical practice act which regulates the customary functions of licensed health
personnel. Similarly, the court indicated that if the foreign graduates had
been registered as residents in an approved anesthesiology program, under
another exception to the medical practice act for interns and residents,
their administration of anesthetics under identical conditions of attenuated
supervision would have been permissible. But the court could find no sta-
tutory authority for the performance of medical functions by unlicensed,
non-resident anesthesiologists. The court did mitigate the penalty, how-
17. There would seem to be small probability of appellate reversal on the law in
this case, since the instructions given the jury were essentially those requested by the
defense. Telephone conversation with Robert W. Baker, Esq., District Att'y of Shasta
County, Redding, Cal., January, 1966.
18. Compare the difficulties experienced with the so-called "community rule" in
malpractice cases, discussed in Professor Leff's article pp. 339-44 infra.
19. 57 Cal. 2d 74, 366 P.2d 816, 17 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1961).
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ever, stating that revocation of the physician's license was an abuse of the
board's discretion in view of the facts that the anesthesiologists were for-
eign-trained specialists, that they had previously been similarly employed
by a state hospital (under still another exception to the medical practice
act regulating employees of state institutions), and that their authority was
an unresolved legal question.
The Magit case demonstrates the strict construction given medical prac-
tice acts by the courts. Strict construction of these statutes is justified on
the policy grounds that mandatory medical licensure is designed to protect
the public against practitioners not meeting legally prescribed standards
of ethics, education, and training. According to the Magit decision, the
performance of medical functions by persons not licensed as physicians
and only minimally supervised by licensed physicians is permitted only
when expressly authorized by statutory exceptions. An example of such
a case would be an unlicensed practitioner whose performance of tasks has
been established by custom and prevailing conditions of practice.
Under this approach, primary responsibility for developing legal rules
regarding delegation of tasks by physicians to non-physicians lies with the
legislatures rather than the courts. If delegations are judged by strictly
construed medical practice acts, they are permissible only to the extent
that these medical licensure statutes, reflecting traditional policies of public
protection, are expressly modified by exceptions accommodating new pol-
icies of increased physician productivity and manpower utilization. For
example, the Magit case undoubtedly would have been decided differently
(or, more probably, would never have arisen) if the California statute's
exemption of hospital employees" were more broadly phrased to include
non-licensed physicians working in either state or non-state institutions.
Such an exemption, distinguishing between independently and institution-
ally rendered services, deserves further legislative consideration. The safety
of patients may be adequately assured by the many institutional safeguards
now required for hospital accreditation by the Joint Commission on Ac-
creditation of Hospitals,2 ' and such accreditation could be statutorily re-
quired for exemption from mandatory licensure.
The licensure statutes of four states, Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, and
Oklahoma, provide more general exemptions for delegations of functions.2 2
20. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2137.1 (Deering Supp. 1966).
21. See generally AMERICAN Hosp. Ass'N, Hosr. ACCREDITATION REFEENCE.S
(1964).
22. Awuz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1421 (Supp. 1966); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §
91-1-6(3) (1963); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2872 (1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 59, § 492 (Supp. 1966).
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Although these four exemption clauses are similar in purpose, they have
significantly different effects because of variations in their phraseology. The
Arizona and Oklahoma exemptions apply only to delegations made by
physicians, while the Colorado and Kansas provisions also cover other li-
censed practitioners of "the healing arts." Under the Oklahoma statute,
exempt delegations must be made to "a physician's trained assistant, a
registered nurse, or a licensed practical nurse." In the other three states
delegations may presumably be made to any person, although in Arizona
the delegatee must be "acting in his customary capacity, not in violation
of any statute," and in Kansas he must be performing "professional serv-
ices." Perhaps the most important differences among these statutes occur
in their requirements of supervision. An exempt delegation may be per-
formed in Kansas, "under the supervision or by order of or referral from"
the delegator, and in Arizona, "at the direction of or under the supervision
of" the delegator. The Oklahoma exemption specifies "direct supervision
and control," and the Colorado statute requires "personal and responsible
direction and supervision."
The latter criteria may well create as many problems as they solve.
Without further statutory definitions, their terminology is subject to a va-
riety of interpretations. Terms such as "supervision" and "direction" seem
to be used with different meanings in the several statutes. Even within
the individual states, considerable judicial decision or executive interpre-
tation seems necessary to determine reasonably certain meanings for the
criteria. On the other hand, semantic precision would only complicate
problems caused by establishing a single statutory criterion of supervision
to govern all delegations in a state-regardless of variations in the functions
to be delegated, the conditions under which delegations are made, the
qualifications of delegatees, or under some statutes, the professional status
of delegators. Furthermore, in light of the difficulties frequently encoun-
tered in amending medical practice acts, statutory criteria may not be suf-
ficiently adaptable to future changes in the organization and requirements
of health services and in the utilization and qualifications of auxiliary
health manpower.
Because of the many variables, both medical and legal, involved in as-
sessing the propriety of delegations, it is difficult to resolve this issue through
either the enactment of a single statutory standard or the accumulation
of case-law criteria. Ideally, the problem warrants a tripartite solution:
first, broad statutory provisions in which the legislature strikes a balance
between policies of public protection and manpower utilization; second,
detailed regulations in which a specialized administrative agency applies
Washington University Open Scholarship
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legislative policies to health service practices and needs; and third, an
adjudicative process in which the administrative agency, the courts, or both,
may construe and enforce the statutes and regulations. Early considera-
tion of such a solution is necessitated by the real possibility that, until
the issue of delegation is clarified, new and desirable utilizations of health
manpower may be inhibited by uncertainties regarding physicians' lia-
bility to disciplinary actions,23 civil judgments,2" or criminal penalties."
Facilitating implementation of the suggested solution is the fact that every
state already possesses a governmental agency charged with administration
of its medical practice act.26
B. Licensing Agencies
The licensure statutes of all states provide for the establishment and
operation of official licensing agencies to regulate admission to and con-
tinuation in medical practice. The authority, composition, and procedures
of these agencies determine to a considerable extent the manner in which
licensure laws are administered, and thus have an important influence on
the qualification and use of physicians.
Medical licensing boards, as primary creations of the medical practice
acts, evolved historically to protect the public against incompetence, quack-
ery, deception, and unethical practices. Their function is to assure com-
pliance with minimum qualifications specified in the statutes by super-
vising the licensure process and policing the practice of medicine. They
are empowered to determine the eligibility of candidates for licensure (in-
cluding review of character and moral fitness, assessment of educational
qualifications, administration of examinations, and approval of postgrad-
uate internships); to accredit or approve medical schools; to issue, reg-
ister, and renew medical licenses; to decide the recognition to be given to
licenses of other jurisdictions; to make administrative rules and regulations
concerning professional standards; and to suspend, revoke, and reinstate
licenses in disciplinary proceedings.
23. See Magit v. Board of Med. Examiners, 57 Cal. 2d 74, 366 P.2d 816, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 488 (1961), discussed in text accompanying note 19 supra.
24. See Barber v. Reinking, 68 Wash. 2d 122, 411 P.2d 861 (1966).
25. See People v. Whittaker, No. 35307, Justice Court of Redding Judicial District
(Shasta County, Cal., Dec. 1966), discussed in text accompanying note 15 supra.
26. Medical licensing agencies are discussed at pp. 258-64 infra. Existing regulatory
powers of many of these agencies seem sufficiently broad to authorize their promulgation
of rules governing delegation of medical functions.
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1. Composition of Boards
State Boards of Medical Examiners or equivalent agencies range in
numbers of members from three to sixteen, with an average membership
of about eight.27 Physicians comprise the largest number of members,
constituting the entire board in thirty-three states and a large majority
in most others. 8 In sixteen jurisdictions the membership includes one or
more members of other professions or occupations licensed by the same
board-osteopaths, chiropractors, chiropodists, veterinarians, dentists, etc.29
Thus, the vast majority of states require that all members of the board
be practicing physicians or other professionals regulated by the board.
The statutes of seven states provide for one or two public members of
the board, i.e., persons other than practitioners licensed by the agency.
In six of these states, the public members are state officials.2 " One state
requires the appointment of a public member who is not a state official."'
2. Selection of Board Members
In the great majority of states, the governor appoints the Board of Med-
ical Examiners or its equivalent from a list of licensed physicians recom-
mended by the state medical society."- In eight states appointments by
the governor require the advice and consent of the senate. In eight juris-
dictions, designated governmental agencies or officials make the appoint-
ments, although subject to the approval of the governor in some of these
states. 3 In contrast, the state medical society has sole power to select mem-
27. Appendix 1, "Composition of Agency-Total Number" column.
28. Appendix 1, "Compostion of Agency-M.D.'s" column.
29. Appendix 1, "Composition of Agency-Other Occupations" column.
30. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1305 (1947) (Commissioner of Law Enforcement);
Ky. RLv. STAT. ANN. § 211.040 (1963) (Commissioner of Health); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 7024 (Supp. 1966) (Elected by State Board of Health); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
329:4 (1966) (Director of Division of Public Health Services, ex offlCio); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 122 (Supp. 1966) (Commissioner of Professional and Occupational Af-
fairs, and Secretary of Health); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-2A-1 (Supp. 1967) (State
Director of Health, ex officio). In five of the states the public officials must either be
licensed or eligible to be licensed to practice.
31. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2100, 2101 (Deering Supp. 1966) (one public
member not licensed in medicine, osteopathy, or chiropractic).
32 Appendix 1, "Appointment by Governor" and "Recommendation by Med-
ical Society" columns.
33. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 60G (Smith-Hurd 1966); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§211.040 (1963); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7024 (Supp. 1964); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-117
(1966) (Dep't of Health); N.Y. EDUc. LAw § 6503 (McKinney 1953) (Board of Re-
gents); R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-26-2 (Supp. 1966) (Director of Health with approval of
Governor); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-1-6 (1953) (Director of Registration with approval
of Governor); D.C. CODE § 2-109 (1967) (Commission on Healing Arts).
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bers of the board in two states.34 The most marked variations in methods
of selection are represented by Alabama, where the Board of Censors of
the state medical society constitutes the Board of Medical Examiners, and
by Mississippi, where the State Board of Health performs the licensing
function for physicians.
More important than who formally appoints members of the board is
the source of recommendations for membership. In twenty-three states the
state medical society recommends physicians for appointment, and in nine
states other professional societies of personnel licensed by the same board
may recommend one or more members." One state provides for recom-
mendations by the medical society after consultation with the deans of the
medical schools of the state, 6 and another state provides for selection of
the board by the "Medical and Chirurgical Faculty" of the state. Thus,
in the majority of states, selection of the members of the medical licensure
board is determined largely by professional societies, and in only two states
is the selection influenced by medical educators.
The Council of State Governments has listed the contention of those
who support legal provisions permitting professional associations to nom-
inate or select members of a licensing board:"
(1) They [the legal provisions] are necessary safeguards to pre-
vent the positions from being used for purposes of political patronage.
(2) They ensure the selection of competent, well-qualified individ-
uals.
(3) They guarantee expert understanding of the problems faced
by practitioners in the occupation.
(4) Above all, they give the practitioners being regulated a sense
of participation in selecting their regulators and thus ensure their close
cooperation in maintaining high standards of practice.
In the same report, the Council summarized opposing arguments: 3"
Those who criticize the degree to which private associations play a
role in selecting licensing board members emphasize the general prin-
ciple that government officials should represent the public as a whole,
not private groups. They assert that members of licensing boards,
when selected by occupational associations, may find their loyalty to
the public welfare in conflict with their allegiance to the association.
Many such critics urge that chief executives of the states should have
34. ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 258 (Supp. 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-3 (1965).
35. Appendix 1, "Recommendation by Other Professional Societies" column.
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 122 (1962).
37. MNI. CODE ANN. art. 43, § 120 (1965).
38. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LEOISLATION IN THE
STATES 38 (1952).
39. Id.
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wider latitude in selecting board members than now prevails. They
point out that this accords with a general trend to increase the powers
of Governors to appoint the members of their administrations. Applied
to the occupational licensing boards, it is asserted, this principle would
greatly increase their accountability to the public.
3. Qualification of Board Members
All states require physician members of the medical licensing board to
be licensed practitioners. In more than half the jurisdictions, a physician
member must have practiced in the state for a specified time, usually five
years."0
Thirteen states provide an absolute bar to board membership for faculty
members or persons connected with educational institutions.4 ' These pro-
visions were enacted with a double purpose: to exclude the possible bias
of persons with commercial interest in proprietary schools training health
personnel, and to prevent faculty members from exercising any predilection
they might have in favor of their own graduates. The first reason is gen-
erally sound, since obvious conflict of interests should disqualify persons
with a financial or managerial interest in profit-making schools engaged
in preparing licensure candidates."2 This reason no longer applies to med-
ical school faculties, however, and even the second reason is of question-
able applicability. In view of the quality of modern American medical
schools, their non-profit character, and their accreditation system, it may
no longer be necessary for licensing boards to provide an independent check
of licensure qualifications, separate from judgment of academic qualifi-
cations."3 Furthermore, restricting medical school faculty members bars
from the Board of Medical Examiners physicians who are eminently
qualified to uphold standards of practice, and who can contribute to the
licensing agency their knowledge of new directions in medical education
and research. In recognition of these facts (and also, perhaps, because
more states have developed their own medical schools), limitations on fac-
ulty members have been repealed in several states.4 Indeed, one state
40. Appendix 1, "Requirement of Practice in State" column.
41. Appendix 1, "Limitation on Faculty" column.
42. Compare the unique Nebraska provision that no member of the board may
be connected with a wholesale or jobbing house dealing in medical supplies. NEB. Rv.
STAT. § 71-115 (1966).
43. Of course, the statutes must distinguish between accredited medical schools and
schools of chiropractic and other such educational institutions. The exclusion of faculty
members of proprietary institutions and institutions offering degrees not recognized by
the U.S. Office of Education is sound policy.
44. See, e.g., Axuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1402 (Supp. 1967) which replaced former
§ 32-1403(D) in 1964. But the repeal in Arizona is almost nullified by the concurrent
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now has an affirmative provision requiring one member of the board to
be a full-time member of the University of Illinois medical school faculty."
Nine states require that board members be selected on the basis of geo-
graphic distribution throughout the state.46 As an administrative pro-
vision to facilitate the hearing and processing of disciplinary actions in
various parts of the state, the geographic requirement may serve a valid
purpose. Such a provision may also be intended to promote liaison be-
tween the board and the profession. If, however, the requirement is de-
signed to assure representation of various sectional interests of the profes-
sion, then it is questionable. Good medical practice knows no geographic
boundaries, 7 and licensing boards are established primarily to be pro-
tective of the public, not to be representative of the profession.
4. Status of Boards
In most states the agency licensing physicans is an autonomous agency
of the state government. However, in seven states the medical licensing
board is administratively attached to the state department of public healh;"
and in another ten states the licensing agencies for physicians are con-
nected to various departments charged with regulation and licensure of
other professions and occupations, which may or may not be limited to
health fields.4" Even in this minority of states in which the medical board
is attached to a department of state government, the board generally op-
erates independently of supervision or involvement by the department.
Thus, the operation of medical licensure boards is usually separate from
other health functions of state government. Board members are answerable
only to the governor, who generally may remove them from office only for
egregious conduct-incompetence, neglect of duty, or unprofessional or
dishonorable conduct. In general, there is no supervision of the operations
requirement that board members must have engaged in the full-time practice of med-
icine in the state for five years preceding appointment.
45. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 60a (Supp. 1966).
46. ALAs A STAT. ANN. § 08.64.010 (1962); ARIZ. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1402(A)
(Supp. 1967); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 72-602B(a) (1957); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-902,
-903 (Supp. 1966); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1805 (1947); MONT. REv. CODES ANN.
§ 66-1001 (1961); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1351 (1962); VA. CoDn ANN. § 54-282
(1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-2A-1 (Supp. 1967).
47. Cf. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211
N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966), in which the Supreme Court of
Illinois stated that a physician must exercise care and skill appropriate to the risk,
and that the "community standard" can no longer justify less than adequate medical
care.
48. See Appendix 1, "State Department" column.
49. Id.
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of these boards except for the power of the courts to review some of their
actions upon complaint of an aggrieved candidate or licensee.
The autonomy of medical licensing boards is reflected in the methods
used to finance their operations. In thirty-nine states licensing fees sup-
port the boards' functions."0 These fees are either deposited in a separate
fund or are deposited in the state treasury but ear-marked for the boards'
use. The other states and the District of Columbia finance the medical
board from general revenues as an operational expense of state govern-
ment."'
Despite the administrative independence of medical licensure agencies,
only eighteen states limit their medical boards to the licensing of physicians,
and establish other agencies to license other health practitioners. In the
majority of states, the licensing agency for physicians also licenses mem-
bers of other health occupations. 5 These include both legitimate allied
and auxiliary personnel (osteopaths, podiatrists, physical therapists, dis-
pensing opticians, etc.) and, in some states, non-scientific practitioners
(homeopaths, chiropractors, drugless healers, masseurs, etc.). Though
the policy of licensing non-scientific practitioners is questionable, 3 it is
significant that most states have elected to have a single agency license a
variety of health personnel, thus to some extent administratively integrating
the regulation of health manpower.
As currently constituted and operated, medical licensing agencies are
generally adequate for the administration of medical practice acts. The
competence and dedication of the boards' memberships usually offsets minor
defects in the structure and procedure of their operation. As long as med-
ical licensure is limited to its traditional function of prescribing minimal
personnel standards necessary for the protection of the public, current
legislative trends (such as the repeals of requirements of geographic repre-
sentation and restrictions on medical school faculty members) should suf-
fice to maintain the efficacy of the licensing agencies. If, on the other
hand, it is ever proposed that the licensure mechanism be revised so that
it no longer merely enforces minimum standards for public protection,
but also promotes maximum standards for public service, then it would
50. Appendix 1, "Financing of Agency-Special Fund" column. Special financ-
ing of the board's operations may explain the statutory provisions for nominal com-
pensation for board members. Compensation ranges to a high of $30 per diem plus
expenses in Texas, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 4502 (1966). Per diem rates of $10,
$15, and $25 are common for this highly skilled and exacting service.
51. Appendix 1, "Financing of Agency-General Fund" column.
52. Appendix 1, "Other Occupations Licensed by Same Agency" column.
53. See pp. 298-305 infra.
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be necessary to re-examine the composition, selection, qualifications, and
status of the medical boards. For example, if the governmental regulatory
process were to assume a larger role in promulgating and administering
criteria for the delegation of medical functions to allied and auxiliary
personnel, 4 some of the present characteristics of the medical agencies
would assume critical importance. Especially significant would be the
domination of their memberships by physicians and, in some states, of
their selection processes by medical societies. An additional problem would
be their administrative detachment from state agencies regulating and
planning comprehensive health services and, in some states, from licensing
boards governing other health professionals.
0. Licensure Qualifications
All medical practice acts specify the personal and educational training
and testing requirements which candidates for licensure must meet. These
requirements are reviewed here for graduates of medical schools in the
United States and for foreign medical graduates. The present review
emphasizes issues in the licensure statutes which have implications for
the development and use of high-quality medical manpower.
1. Personal Qualifications
a. age. Most state statutes require that licensure candidates be over
twenty-one years of age, although some states have no age requirement."
In view of the length of medical training in the United States, existing
minimum age requirements probably do not delay licensure of qualified
physicians.
b. character. All states require "good moral character" for medical
licensure. This requirement has generally been held by the courts to be
negated by conviction of a felony or an offense involving "moral turpi-
tude." 6 It is possible that standards specified in the statute for suspension
or revocation of licenses may be deemed relevant in defining the "good
moral character" requisite for admission to practice." The paucity of
54. See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
55. States without age requirements are: Cal., Ga., Hawaii, Idaho, Ind., Iowa, Minn.,
Miss., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.M., Ore., Wash., and W. Va.
56. E.g., Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); State Bd. of Med. Educ.
& Licensure v. Simon, 62 Dauph. 215 (Pa. County Ct. 1951); cf. Hirsh v. San Fran-
cisco, 143 Cal. App. 2d 313, 325, 300 P.2d 177, 185 (1956).
57. Cf. Hallinan v. Comm'n of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 453, 421 P.2d 76,
81, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 233 (1966), in which California Supreme court stated:
Fundamentally, the question involved in both situations is the same-is the ap-
plicant for admission or the attorney sought to be disciplined a fit and proper
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judicial interpretation of this vague requirement, except in cases of heinous
offenses, indicates that licensing boards have wide discretion in defining
"good moral character" as long as they do not act arbitrarily or capri-
ciously." Thus, procedures for contesting a board's interpretation of the
criterion are important to protect both the rights of individual candidates
and the interest of society in the admission to practice of all qualified can-
didates." It would be an unsound limitation on medical manpower to bar
qualified physicians for characteristics unrelated to professional responsi-
bilities and duties.
c. citizenship. Full United States citizenship is required for medical
licensure in twenty-three states."0 Prior filing of a declaration of intention
to become a citizen is required in another twenty-three states. 1 Two states
modify their full citizenship requirements to allow declarations of intent
for Canadians. 2 Six jurisdictions have no citizenship requirements for
graduates of U.S. and Canadian medical schools.
63
Although the requirement of citizenship for licensure in a health occu-
pation has been upheld as not palpably arbitrary,64 some legal commentators
person to be permitted to practice law, and that usually turns upon whether he
has committed or is likely to continue to commit acts of moral turpitude. At the
time of oral argument the attorney for respondent frankly conceded that the test
for admission and for discipline is and should be the same. We agree with this
concession. Therefore, in considering the kinds of act which would justify ex-
cluding a candidate for admission we may look to acts which have been relied
upon to sustain decisions to disbar or suspend individuals previously admitted to
practice.
58. See Note, Entrance and Disciplinary Requirements for Occupational Licenses
in California, 14 STAN. L. REv. 533, 538 (1962).
59. See note 153 infra.
60. Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Colo., Del., Fla., Ga., Kan., Ky., La., Mo., Mont., Neb.,
Nev., N.J., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., S.C., Tenn., and W. Va.
For requirements for licensure by endorsement see ENDORSEMENT POLICIES OF MED-
ICAL LICENSING BOARDS FOR GRADUATES OF AMERICAN AND CANADIAN MEDICAL
SCHOOLS, prepared by the Legal Department of the American Medical Association,
[hereinafter cited as ENDORSEMENT POLICIES], dated June 6, 1966.
61. Conn., Hawaii, Idaho, Ind., Iowa, Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mont., N.H., N.J.,
N.M., N.Y., Ore., Pa., R.I., S.D., Tex., Vt., Va., Wis. and Wyo. (at discretion of
board).
New Hampshire, New Jersey and Wyoming provide for temporary licenses to those
who have filed declarations. N.H. REV. STAT. § 329-15 (1966); N.J. REv. STAT. §
45:9-14 (1963); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 33-333(a)(iii) (Supp. 1965). In Rhode Island
and Wyoming full citizenship must be acquired in the minimum allowable time to obtain
permanent licensure. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-37-2 (Supp. 1966); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 33-333(a) (iii) (Supp. 1965).
62. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 66-1003(b)(2) (1962); NEV. REv. STAT. § 630.160
(1963).
63. Cal., D.C., Ill., Me., Utah, and Wash.
64. Sashihara v. Board of Pharmacy, 7 Cal. App. 2d 563, 46 P.2d 804 (1935).
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have contended that citizenship requirements in professional and occupa-
tional licensing are of doubtful constitutionality and basically inconsistent
with the national policy of welcoming aliens and encouraging them to
make their maximum contribution." Licensure laws are constitutional
only if they are proper regulations of qualifications to assure competence
to practice, 6 and "it is difficult to see any rational connection between
citizenship and the appropriate qualifications of the various professions
and occupations." 7 Whether or not the requirement is constitutional, citi-
zenship seems an irrelevant and unnecessary restriction upon available
medical manpower as a matter of public policy.
d. residence. Only one state requires residence in the state as a quali-
fication for initial licensure. 8 In all other jurisdictions, no period of res-
idence in the state is required for United States medical graduates. " States
faced with a considerable influx of physicians, such as California and
Florida, rely on stringent reciprocity-endorsement policies rather than res-
idence requirements to restrict licensure of physicians from other states.1
With respect to residence requirements, the medical practice acts erect
no barriers to the location and mobility of physicians.
e. health. Unlike licensure requirements for other health professions
and occupations, the qualifications for physicians do not generally specify
health requirements. Only one state requires affirmatively that the can-
didate be ". . . physically and mentally able safely to engage in the prac-
tice of medicine. . . ."" Another specifies that the candidate must be free
of active tuberculosis and venereal disease. 2 Although almost all states
provide that a license may be revoked because of physical or mental ill-
ness under certain circumstances,7 only a few states provide that a license
may be initially denied C for these reasons.14 Health requirements, unlike
citizenship requirements, are relevant to a candidate's qualifications as a
physician, and to the statutory objective of assuring the safe and effective
practice of medicine.
65. Fisher & Nathanson, Citizenship Requirements in Professional and Occupational
Licensing in Illinois, 45 COH. BAR R.EC. 391, 397 (1964).
66. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
67. Fisher & Nathanson, supra note 65, at 397.
68. HAwuAI Rv. LAws § 64-3(b) (Supp. 1963) (one year).
69. Jurisdiction of the medical licensing agency is not acquired because of the res-
idence or citizenship of licensure applicants, but because of its duty to protect the
health and welfare of the people of the state.
70. See pp. 277-80 infra.
71. Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1423(7) (Supp. 1967).
72. OKLA. STAT. ANN. fit. 59, § 493 (Supp. 1967).
73. See p. 281 infra.
74. E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 334.100 (1)(11) (Supp. 1965).
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2. Educational Qualifications
The medical practice acts of all the states specify numerous and varied
educational, training, and testing requirements for medical licensure can-
didates. These statutory provisions relate to (1) specific course require-
ments in college and medical school, (2) basic science examinations, (3)
graduation from approved medical schools, (4) postgraduate medical edu-
cation, and (5) licensure examinations.
a. specific course requirements. Requirements in the medical licensure
statutes of high school graduation or its equivalent, and of at least two or
three years of collegiate premedical education, 5 are merely repetitions of
admission requirements of all accredited medical schools in the United
States and Canada. Requirements in the statutes of some states for com-
pletion of specific college courses, generally in chemistry, biology, and
physics, 6 may unnecessarily inhibit innovations in the educational prepara-
tion of physicians. In light of changing trends in American medical educa-
tion and the control of the quality of medical schools through the present
system of accreditation, premedical requirements should be left to admission
policies of the medical schools rather than be dictated by statutes.7 7
With respect to medical education, statutes of only two states specify
the content of the medical curriculum in any detail," but twenty-five states
set forth, with varying specificity, the amount of instruction which must
be completed.7 ' These detailed requirements, holdovers from the 1910
Flexner Report, should be re-examined in light of more recent develop-
ments in medical education and its accreditation. If requirements con-
cerning content or length of the medical curriculum are still deemed nec-
essary, such criteria should be promulgated by regulations of an agency
with sufficient expertise and flexibility to keep pace with essential curricular
revisions. For the modern temper in medical education requires that
medical-school curricula must remain under ruthless and unceasing
scrutiny; they cannot be permitted to grow by sheer accretion. They
must be reviewed at regular intervals by imaginative men who have
talent for abstraction and generalization and who are attuned to the
great syntheses which occur in both the physical and biological sci-
ences.
80
75. Appendix 2, "High School" and "College" columns.
76. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2192 and Appendix 2.
77. See generally CITIZENS' COMM'N ON GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUC., THE GRADUATE
EDUCATION OF PHYSICIANS (1966); L. COGGESHALL, PLANNING FOR MEDICAL PROGRESS
THROUGH EDUCATION (1965); Address by Ruhe, Federation of State Medical Boards
of the United States, in Chicago, Feb. 11, 1967.
78. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2192; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 18.71.055 (1961).
79. Appendix 3, "Medical School Curricula" column; Ruhe, supra note 77.
80. Gengerelli, Education in the Sciences, 193 J.A.M.A. 583, 584 (1965).
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b. basic science examinations. In twenty-one states and the District of
Columbia, a candidate for medical licensure must pass a basic science ex-
amination given by a basic science board, separate from the licensing ex-
amination and the licensing board."' This is an omnibus requirement for
a number of health professions and occupations which is designed to assure
a minimum of scientific knowledge on the part of practitioners of the heal-
ing arts. A corollary purpose of the basic science examination is to exclude
from practice cultists and healers without grounding in science; however,
these examinations have not proved an insurmountable barrier to non-
scientific practitioners."
Non-statutory prerequisites for admission to all accredited United States
and Canadian medical schools include at least one course in each of the
following sciences: basic biology, inorganic chemistry, organic chemistry,
and physics. Medical school instruction in the pre-clinical sciences has
advanced far beyond levels tested by the basic science examinations. In
criticizing the requirement of the basic science examination for physicians,
the Secretary of the New York State Board of Medical Examiners stated: 3
... [W]e have come to the period in which the curricula of the basic
science courses probe so deeply into underlying fundamental scientific
knowledge, actually at the molecular level in many instances, that the
seperation between the various specific subjects becomes artificial.
For modern physicians, the basic science examination is thus an ana-
chronism. It does not demonstrate knowledge of science as well as gradua-
tion from an approved medical school, and it does not test such knowledge
as appropriately as the medical licensure examination. For in fact, all
states, whether or not they have basic science requirements, test knowledge
of basic sciences in their medical licensure examinations.8 4 The basic science
examination should be eliminated as a requirement for medical licensure.
c. approval of medical schools. Forty-seven states require graduation
from an approved medical school as a prerequisite for licensure.85 Power
81. Appendix 2, "Basic Science Certificate" column. For basic science require-
ments for licensure by endorsement, see ENDORSEMENT POLICIES, supra note 60.
82. See WRIGHT, The Point of View of Medical Examining Boards, in BASIC SCIENCE
IN MEDICAL EDUCATION AND IN QUALIFICATION FOR THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 51,
52 (1966).
83. Id. at 53.
84. In fifteen jurisdictions the statute which establishes the basic science board is
sufficiently broad to permit the board to accept examinations of the National Board
of Medical Examiners or state medical boards in lieu of its own: Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Ark.,
Conn., D.C., Iowa, Kan., Minn., Neb., Okla., R.I., Tenn., Wash., and Wis.
85. Appendix 2. Iowa, South Carolina, and Texas do not require that the
medical school be approved. Id. In Hawaii an acceptable alternative to graduation
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss3/3
LICENSURE OF PHYSICIANS
to approve medical schools is given to the Board of Medical Examiners
or its equivalent in each state, but the statutes of several states specifically
require graduation from a medical school approved by the American Med-
ical Association or the Association of American Medical Colleges. Some
statutes provide other standards for approval, such as a medical curriculum
equivalent to that of the state medical school of the licensing state."' In
practice, all state licensing agencies accept the accreditations of schools
by the Joint Liaison Committee on Medical Education of the Association
of Medical Colleges and the Council on Medical Education of the Amer-
ican Medical Association, whether or not required to do so by statute.
With the elimination of proprietary and "diploma-mill" medical schools,
and the development of a national accrediting body for existing schools,
it now seems possible for statutory educational requirements to avoid deal-
ing with premedical or medical curricula, and to base their regulation
upon graduation from an accredited school."7
d. postgraduate medical education. The internship was established as
part of medical education to provide one year of supervised clinical ex-
perience in a hospital following graduation from medical school. Twenty-
five years ago only a few states required an internship,"3 but today all but
seventeen states require some form of internship. 9 Where required, the
internship must be an approved program, sanctioned either by the state
board or by the Council on Medical Education of the American Medical
Association. In three states the internship requirement is discretionary with
the board.9" In two states a rotating internship is required,9 and two
from an approved medical school is active practice in another state, or medical service
with the United States Army, Navy, or Public Health Service for seven of the eleven
years preceding licensure application. HAWAII REv. LAws § 64-3(d) (2) (Supp. 1963).
Approved Canadian medical schools are also accepted in all United States jurisdic-
tions because they are accredited and approved by the same accrediting body as are
American medical schools.
86. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-611 (1956).
87. One problem which the state boards or the national accrediting body may face
in the future results from the policy in some states of favoring their own residents for
admission to state supported medical schools. This policy, although understandable, can
have a detrimental effect on the quality of medical students in some cases and could
potentially affect the quality of the school as well as the number of graduates. See
Johnson & Hutchins, A Study of Medical Student Attrition, 41 J. MED. EDUC. 1097,
1121-38 (1966); Ass'N OF AM. MED. COLLEGES, 2 DATAGRAMS no. 3 (1965), for
correlations indicating that students in medical schools with low expenditures and geo-
graphic restrictions have lower median scores on the Medical College Admission Test.
88. See Sigerist, The History of Medical Licensure, in ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF
MEDICINE (M. Roemer ed. 1960).
89. Appendix 2, "Internship" column. For internship requirements for licensure
by endorsement see ENDORSEMENT POLICIES, supra note 60.
90. AxR. STAT. ANN. § 72-605(f) (1957); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 493 (Supp.
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states have other statutory provisions relating to the specific content of edu-
cational experience beyond medical school. 2 In two additional states a
specified number of years of practice is acceptable in lieu of an internship. 3
As experience with patient care has been incorporated in medical school
curricula through clinical clerkships, and as increasing numbers of phy-
sicians continue from internships to specialty training in residencies, the
nature and purpose of the internship have come under new scrutiny."'
The recent growth of medical and scientific knowledge renders impossible
the teaching of "everything" in four years of medical school, or even med-
ical school plus internship, so that internship, like medical school gradua-
tion, can no longer be relied upon for adequate preparation of physicians.
Furthermore, required internships delay effective graduate education by
repeating clinical experience that is now obtained in the third and fourth
years of medical school. Accordingly, the recent Report of the Citizens
Committee on Graduate Medical Education (the "Millis Report") recom-
mends "that the internship, as a separate and distinct portion of medical
education, be abandoned, and that the internship and residency years be
combined into a single period of graduate medical education called a resi-
dency and planned as a unified whole."9
Implementation of this recommendation would require modification
of many licensure laws to permit the first year of such a graduate program
to be accepted in lieu of internship. Only two state statutes currently
specify that one year of postgraduate training may be substituted for an
internship." In some other states, it is possible that existing statutory pro-
visions regarding the internship requirement may be interpreted to allow
new forms of graduate medical education in place of an actual internship.
Ironically, however, the greatest opportunities to improve postgraduate
medical education would seem to exist in the states with only a discretion-
ary requirement of internship or no internship requirement at all. Where
necessary, state licensure laws should be amended to permit, if not to re-
1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1392 (1967).
91. Medical Licensure Statistics for 1966, 200 J.A.M.A. 1055, table 10 at 1067
(1967).
92. HAWAuI REv. LAws § 64-3(f) (Supp. 1963) (certificate of familiarity with
Hansen's disease from state institution treating this disease); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § §
18.71.050 (2), (3) (1961) (experience in obstetrics and pathology).
93. ALASKA STAT. § 08.64.200 (1962) (four years); NEV. REv. STAT. tit. 54, §
630.160(2) (1963) (seven years).
94. See generally authorities cited supra note 77.
95. CITIZENS' COMM'N ON GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUC., supra note 77, at 62.
96. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1423(4) (Supp. 1967); N.J. REv. STAT. § 45:9-8(3)
(1963).
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quire,97 the substitution of postgraduate educational programs for the
internship.
At the same time, consideration should be given to appropriate methods
of regulating and accrediting these programs. Existing residency programs
are generally designed by teaching hospitals in accordance with require-
ments prescribed by various non-governmental specialty certification
boards. 8 The adequacy of this procedure for licensure purposes should
now be assessed, and the proper roles of governmental agencies, specialty
boards, organized medicine, and medical schools and institutions should
be determined. Although no United States jurisdiction currently requires
graduate training beyond the internship as a requisite for licensure, once an
appropriate system of accreditation is devised, the licensure statutes could
require completion of an approved residency just as thirty-five jurisdic-
tions now require completion of an approved internship. If medical licen-
sure is to signify the end of supervised preparation and the beginning of
independent practice, this amendment of the statutes would most realis-
tically approximate the transformation.
e. licensure examinations. The purpose of examinations for licensure,
required in all states, is to test the candidates' medical knowledge, judg-
ment, and skills. Requirements of examination by a state agency originated
in the United States when proprietary medical schools of dubious quality
were still in existence.99 Since all the present medical schools are of high
quality and fully accredited, and since all states now require graduation
from such schools, it is questionable whether separate licensure examina-
tions are still necessary. It may well be that greater public protection can
now be afforded through an approach analogous to that of the United
Kingdom, whereby fitness to practice is assured only through careful ac-
creditation of medical educational programs, including postgraduate train-
ing. For it is also doubtful that any real test of competence to practice
medicine can be obtained from an examination given at the completion
of an educational process which no longer produces physicians sufficiently
prepared to engage in unsupervised, independent practice of medicine.'
Examinations can only test the candidates' recall of what they learned
in medical school, not the complex attributes of fitness and competence to
97. Cf. CITIZENS' COMm'N ON GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUC., supra note 77, at 63:
"We recommend that state licensure acts . . .be amended to eliminate the requirement
of a separate internship and to substitute therefor an appropriately described period of
graduate medical education."
98. The requirements are described in A.M.A., ANNUAL DIRECTORY OF APPROVE IN-
TERNSHIPS AND RESIDENCIES.
99. See Sigerist, supra note 88.
100. See generally authorities cited supra note 77.
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practice medicine. Thus, the examination device should be retained only
if it is considered desirable as a check upon medical education or useful
as an index of future competence. If, for these reasons, licensure exami-
nations are continued, every effort must be made to assure that the testing
instruments are the best that can be devised, and that the examinations
demand a uniformly high level of performance by candidates.
Preparation and administration of licensure examinations are the respon-
sibility of the Boards of Medical Examiners or equivalent agencies in all
states. Clearly, this is a function peculiarly within the province of physi-
cians, and it is primarily for this reason that the membership of licensure
agencies is dominated by physicians. 1 Depending upon the rationale
chosen to justify licensure examinations, the occasional exclusions of med-
ical faculty members from the boards. 2 are either consistent (if the exam-
ination is an independent assessment of past medical education) or in-
consistent (if it is a reasonable prediction of probable future competence).
Written examinations for initial licensure are given in all states, and in
sixteen states provision is also made for an oral or practical examination,"0 3
although the latter requirements are discretionary with the board in some
states. A candidate's performance on an oral examination is not subject
to the same objective review as his performance on a written examination,
and the statutes of two states deal with the possibility of prejudicial judg-
ment of oral examinations by either requiring written transcripts1 14 or by
authorizing recording of oral examinations.'
In forty-one states and the District of Columbia, certification by the
non-governmental National Board of Medical Examiners0 . is acceptable
for initial licensure in lieu of the state examination,' and many state
101. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 41-45 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted that college
and university faculty members are generally assigned responsibility for administering
statutory basic science examinations, and medical school faculty members participate in
development of the examinations given by the National Board of Medical Examiners.
103. Ariz., Cal., Iowa, Minn., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.D., Ore., Pa., R.I., S.C.,
Tenn., W. Va., Wis., and Wyo.
104. ARxz. RBv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1428(e) (Supp. 1967).
105. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 33-333(b) (Supp. 1965).
106. The membership of the National Board includes representatives from the Fed-
eration of State Medical Boards of the U.S., the Council on Medical Education of the
American Medical Association, the Association of American Medical Colleges, the Amer-
ican Hospital Association, the U.S. Armed Services, and the Veterans Administration. In
addition, members at large are elected from among leading physicians throughout the
nation. See generally Womack, The Evolution of the National Board of Medical Exam-
iners, 192 J.A.M.A. 817 (1965).
107. The nine states which do not recognize National Board certification for initial
licensure are: Ark., Del., Fla., Ga., Ind., La., Mich., N.C., and Tex. However, Delaware,
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boards purchase questions prepared by the National Board for use in their
own examinations."' 8 Two states require an oral examination if the appli-
cation for licensure is made five or more years after National Board cer-
tification."0 9 No state requires passage of the entire three-part examination
of the National Board of Medical Examiners as a condition of licensure,
although many medical educators, practitioners, and state-board members
agree that Parts I and II of the National Board examination are the best
available tests of medical school education, and that Part III approaches
more closely than anything yet devised a reasonably valid test of compe-
tence to practice medicine. In view of these achievements of the National
Board, all states should at least recognize its certification for initial licensure.
The number of physicians certified by the National Board could per-
haps be increased if more medical schools required students to take the
examinations. Present use of the National Board examinations varies among
medical schools, but in some schools students may be required to pass Part I
before being promoted to the junior class, and/or to pass Part II before
being awarded the M.D. degree. 1 In 1966, seventy-five per cent of the
sophomore or senior classes in sixty-six of the nation's eighty-five medical
schools took National Board examinations.""
3. Foreign Medical Graduates
All but three states have specific statutory authority for licensure of
graduates of foreign medical schools." 2 Several states issue to foreign med-
ical graduates a special certificate for limited institutional training or prac-
Indiana, North Carolina, and Texas accept National Board certification if the diplomate
has been licensed by another state, and Georgia accepts certificates of the National
Board issued prior to October, 1953.
108. See Fordham, Medical Licensure; A Comparative View, 192 J.A.M.A. 832
(1965).
109. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2321 (Deering 1960); ORE. REv. STAT. § 677.120(5)
(1965).
110. Letter from the National Board of Medical Examiners to the authors, Feb. 16,
1967.
111. 14 NAT'L BD. EXAmINER 3 (Nov. 1966).
112. Arkansas, Louisiana, and Nevada have no provisions for the licensure of foreign
medical graduates. See Appendix 2, "Foreign Medical Graduates" column. In Delaware
the licensure statute requires graduation from an approved medical school in the United
States or Canada, but exceptions may be made on the unanimous recommendation of
the licensing agency. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1733(b) (Supp. 1966).
This discussion of licensure of foreign medical graduates is not applicable to grad-
uates of approved Canadian medical schools, who are generally treated the same as
United States graduates because their schools are accredited by the same accrediting
body as are American medical schools.
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tice."' One state sets a maximum limit of fifty licenses a year which may be
issued to foreign graduates."'
In general, the age, character, and citizenship requirements applicable
to graduates of United States medical schools"' also apply to foreign med-
ical graduates. Several states also require a period of residence in the state
for foreign graduates," 6 although this is almost never a requirement for
United States graduates."' One state requires that a foreign graduate be
recommended by the medical society in the county of the applicant's res-
idence." 8
Licensure is a process for determining professional competency and
should not be used as a substitute for sound immigration policies."' The
only valid special provisions for foreign medical graduates are those re-
lated to education, training, and language ability. The object of statutes
regulating licensure of foreign graduates is therefore limited to assuring
that candidates are adequately educated, with sufficient proficiency in the
English language and familiarity with the practice of modem American
medicine.
Since no procedures exist for evaluating and accrediting foreign medical
schools (except for Canadian schools, the American University of Beirut,
and the University of the Philippines), most foreign medical graduates must
be evaluated individually and thoroughly in terms of their individual com-
petence to practice medicine. The task of evaluating and verifying indi-
vidual qualifications and credentials cannot be based upon the quality of
a candidate's medical school. The task is eased, however, by the services
of the Educational Council for Foreign Medical Graduates (the "ECFMG"
-sponsored by the American Hospital Association, the American Medi-
cal Association, the Association of American Medical Colleges, and the
Federation of State Medical Boards) in establishing standards and ad-
113. E.g., Mo. Rzv. STAT. § 334.045 (Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §
498(d) (Supp. 1967); S.D. CODE § 27.0308 (1960). Medical Licensure Statistics for
1966, supra note 91, table 10 at 1104.
114. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 147.15 (1m) (Supp. 1967).
115. See pp. 264-66 supra.
116. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1733(a) (4) (Supp. 1966); HAwAIi REv. LAWS
§ 64-3(b) (1963); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-3-4 (1966). See also CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 2193(d) (Deering 1960) (requiring one year of internship in the state).
117. See notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.
118. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-3-4 (1961).
119. See 2 THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HEART DISEASE, CANCER AND STROKE:
A NATIONAL PRoGRAm To CONQUER HEART DISEASE, CANCER AND STROKE 281
(1964) for discussion of the propriety of importing physicians from other countries to
the United States.
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ministering examinations to determine whether foreign medical graduates
are qualified to serve as interns and residents in graduate training programs.
In forty states and the District of Columbia, the licensure law requires
an ECFMG certificate as a requisite for licensure, either as the exclusive
educational requirement or as one of several requirements for a foreign
graduate. 2 ' Graduate medical education, consisting of either an internship
or residency or both, is generally required." In at least six states more than
one year of graduate medical education in an approved internship or resi-
dency is required for foreign medical graduates.'22 Another state statute
provides that if an applicant's medical school is not approved, the dean
of the medical school of the state university may examine the qualifications
of the applicant and advise the board as to whether the applicant has had
training equivalent to that required.2 3 At least six states also require an
existing license to practice from either the country of the applicant's medi-
cal school or elsewhere.12 4
The statutes of only two states specifically require proficiency in the
English language for licensure.125 Although language proficiency is tested
by the ECFMG examination and may be evaluated by the licensure boards
in oral examinations or interviews (frequently required of foreign grad-
uates), nevertheless the statutes do not reflect the importance of this qual-
ification.
Since foreign graduates cannot be judged by their completion of an ac-
credited educational process, and since the ECFMG examinations test
only competency to perform as hospital interns or residents, an exacting
licensure examination is necessary to determine the fitness of foreign grad-
uates to practice medicine. The statutes or regulations of all states except
three subject foreign graduates to the same examination requirements as
United States graduates,' although the special need for uniformly rig-
orous and comprehensive testing in these cases could best be met by re-
quiring, instead of sometimes permitting, substitution of the National
Board examinations. 7
120. Appendix 2, "ECFMG Certification" column.
121. Appendix 2, "Internship or Residency" column.
122. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1424(4) (Supp. 1967) (two years); CAL. Bus.
& PROF CODE § 2193 (Deering 1960) (two years); HAwAII iRv. LAWS § 64-3(d) (3)
(Supp. 1963) (three years); IowA CODE ANN. § 148.3(1)(b) (Supp. 1966) (three
years); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.570(1) (1963) (five years); VA. CODE ANN. §
54.306.3 (1950) (two years).
123. Wis. REv. STAT. § 147.15(lm) (Supp. 1965).
124. Appendix 2, "Existing License" column.
125. E.g., Asuz. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1424(5) (Supp. 1967)
126. Appendix 2.
127. Cf. pp. 271-73 supra.
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D. Registration, Renewal, and Reinstatement of Licenses
Nearly all states require that medical licenses be registered or recorded
with a public agency and thus be open to public inspection.128 Some re-
quire registration of the license with the clerk of the county in which the
licensee intends to practice, or with some other local official. 2 Other
states have statutory provisions that require an official state agency to
publish an annual directory of licensees.' All registration provisions are
designed to provide a public record of physicians licensed to practice med-
icine in the state. A list of active licenses cannot be maintained, of course,
without a system of periodic license renewal.
Forty-six jurisdictions, require renewal of medical licenses either each
year (thirty-five) or every two years (eleven) .1 1 The significant feature
of license renewal is not what it entails but what it does not entail. A
routine and clerical measure, renewal requires only the signature of the
physician and the payment of a nominal fee. No other information is re-
quired-no showing of continuing education undertaken or its effect on
the physician's skills, and no evidence of the physician's having updated
his knowledge and credentials to keep pace with medical progress. Not a
single state attempts to prevent educational obsolescence by requiring evi-
dence of further education or professional growth as a condition for main-
taining licenses in good standing.
Continuing ability to practice medicine is also potentially involved in
the reinstatement of lapsed licenses. 32 In most states, however, the statute
requires only an application for reinstatement and the payment of a re-
quired fee, which may include a delinquency charge. 3 In one state, if a
license has lapsed for five lears, the physician may be required to repeat
the entire licensure procedure, including examination. 3' Another unusual
provision requires a retired physician who wishes to return to active prac-
tice to demonstrate that he is "physically and mentally able safely to en-
128. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 334.060 (1959); TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. art.
4499 (1966).
129. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 334.060 (1959); TEX. RnV. Civ. STAT. art.
4498(a) (1966).
130. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2111 (Deering 1960); N.Y. EDUa. LAW
§ 6510 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
131. The five states without renewal requirements are Ky., Mass., Miss., N.J., and
Ohio.
132. For dicussion of reinstatement of licenses after disciplinary suspension or re-
vocation, see P. 290 infra.
133. E.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-1-23 (1963); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-110(3)
(1943).
134. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2376.5 (Deering Supp. 1966).
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gage in the practice and still possesses the medical knowledge required
therefor.""' 5 This is the only statute which requires evidence of continuing
qualifications for reinstatement.
Thus, educational obsolescence is generally involved in the licensure
process only when it becomes sufficiently grievous to provide grounds for
disciplinary action," 6 and may be recognized by the judicial process only
when it satisfies the negligence standard in malpractice cases."7 Since
both protection of the public welfare and preservation of manpower re-
sources require the prevention of educational obsolescence among prac-
ticing physicians, the question arises whether the legal process should some-
how establish higher standards than those enforced in disciplinary and mal-
practice proceedings. For the present, non-governmental agencies, such
as medical institutions and professional associations, are acting to prevent
educational obsolescence by assessing physician performance in hospitals
and by establishing and requiring programs of continuing education and
re-evaluation."' Statutory requirements for license renewal and reinstate-
ment are the logical means of reinforcing these non-governmental efforts.
Despite admitted problems of accreditation, specialty differentiation, and
individual evaluation, requirements of formal continuing education as a
condition of license renewal are deserving of further consideration by the
profession.
E. Recognition of Other States' Licenses
All states except Florida and Hawaii provide some means of recognizing
licenses of other states. Physicians licensed in other states and seeking li-
censure in these two states must take the state board examinations 3 . and
fulfill all other requirements for initial licensure.
Recognition of other states' licenses in the remaining forty-eight states
and the District of Columbia may be accomplished through endorsement
of the existing license or through reciprocity with the licensing state. 4
Theoretically, endorsement requires only that either the qualifications of
of the licensee or the standards required for licensure in the original licens-
ing state be equivalent to the licensure requirements of the state in which
135. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1429(F) (Supp. 1967).
136. Cf. pp. 280-87 infra.
137. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTs § 40 (2d ed. 1955); Professor Leff's
article infra.
138. See The Quality of Medicine is Strained, 200 J.A.M.A. 1122 (1967).
139. However, Hawaii will accept certification by the National Board of Medical
Examiners. HAwAI REv. LAws § 64-3 (Supp. 1963).
140. See generally ENDORSEMENT POLICIES, supra note 60.
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licensure is being sought. Reciprocity has two components-equivalence
of licensure requirements in the two states, and recognition by the original
licensing state of the licenses of the state in which licensure is sought."'
As a practical matter, endorsement and reciprocity are often used inter-
changeably.
In addition to the basic factors of equivalence and reciprocity, the sta-
tutes may provide other requirements for recognition-such as a basic
science certificate, internship, prior professional practice for a specified
number of years, citizenship, state residence, or an oral or practical exam-
ination. "2 Although forty-nine jurisdictions reciprocate with or endorse
licenses issued by other states, in sixteen of these all endorsements of licenses
are at the discretion of the licensing board, 3 and only eight states recipro-
cate with or endorse the licenses of all other jurisdictions. 44
Restrictions upon recognition of other states' licenses, like all provisions
of medical licensure laws, are constitutionally justifiable exercises of state
police power only insofar as they regulate the competence of physicians for
the protection of the public 45 In an era of medical manpower shortages
it is especially important that this be the sole criterion for restrictions upon
the interstate mobility of physicians. The constitutional test must be ap-
plied to existing restrictions which, as noted above, are primarily based
upon either a lack of equivalence in licensure requirements or a lack of
reciprocity in recognition policies of the states involved.
Equivalence of individual qualifications and licensure standards is clearly
related to professional competence and public protection. The most funda-
mental licensure standards, required by all states, are graduation from an
approved medical school and passage of a licensure examination. For the
former, equivalence of medical education is assured by national accredi-
141. Although some licensure statutes refer to reciprocity agreements between states,
no formal agreements exist. Reciprocity is determined by regulations of the licensing
boards or by informal arrangements between jurisdictions.
142. See ENDORSEMENT POLICIES, supra note 60. A few states also require that the
existing license for which endorsement is sought must have been procured without fraud,
or within a specified number of years preceding the current application, and/or that it
must never have been suspended or revoked. In some states an applicant who has failed
the state licensing examination cannot thereafter be granted a license on the basis of
credentials from another state.
143. Ala., Ariz., Cal., Del., D.C., Idaho, Ill., Iowa, Kan., Ky., Md., N.H., N.Y.,
Okla., Pa., and Wyo.
144. Conn., Ind., Mass., Mont., Neb., Ohio, S.C., and Va. See ENDORSEMENT POLl-
cmas, supra note 60.
145. Dent v. West Virgina, 129 U.S. 114 (1888). For a more comprehensive state-
ment of the constitutional scope of the states' police power, see Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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tation, which has eliminated sub-standard medical schools and provided
certifications used by all state licensing agencies. 4 ' For the latter, equiv-
alence of examination performance may eventually be assured by universal
requirement and recognition of the examinations given by the National
Board of Medical Examiners."' In the meantime, states should be free
to discriminate against licenses issued by other states on the basis of exam-
ination standards inferior to their own.
Even if licensure standards are equivalent, the states should also be able
to refuse recognition to physicians originally licensed elsewhere whose abil-
ity to practice has been impaired by educational obsolescence or physical
or mental infirmities. Similarly, in determining conditions for practice within
their boundaries, states may prohibit the entrance of physicians for part-
time, semi-retired, or semi-vacation practice, where this regulation is de-
signed to protect the public. There is a real question, however, as to
whether states should be free to impose such limitations upon the immi-
gration of physicians licensed by other states, and not require similar stan-
dards for continued practice by physicians already licensed in the juris-
diction. Another kind of "equivalence" is involved here, and its disre-
gard can produce doubts as to whether regulations are protections of pa-
tients against incompetent practice or protections of physicians against eco-
nomic competition. Regulations which establish different, discriminatory
requirements for out-of-state licensed physicians may thus lose their con-
stitutionally required "reasonable relationship" to public health, safety,
and welfare, and may violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the full faith
and credit clause' or the commerce clause' 9 of the Federal Constitution.
Reciprocity restrictions upon license recognition may also exceed state
police power, since the existence or non-existence of interstate mutuality
146. See pp. 268-69 supra.
147. See notes 106-07 supra and accompanying text. As there indicated, 42 juris-
dictions currently accept National Board certification in lieu of state examination for
initial licensure, and 46 accept such certificates for endorsement of other states' licenses.
148. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. In no instances have medical licenses, or any other
state licenses limiting certain activities to qualified individuals, been construed as
"public acts" entitled to full faith and credit by sister states. See Jackson, The Full
Faith and Credit Clause; The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUm. L.
REv. 1 (1945).
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Whether a state's restrictions upon the entrance of
physicians could be held to violate the commerce clause would depend on whether the
applicable regulation of the practice of medicine was construed to affect interstate
commerce, and whether the regulation was considered to impose an undue burden on
such commerce. In the absence of precisely relevant precedent, these questions cannot
be definitively answered since they involve some of the most complex issues in consti-
tutional law. See, e.g., A Symposium on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 46
VA. L. REv. 1051 (1960).
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is entirely irrelevant to a physician's professional competence and licensure
qualifications. Although pressures created by the shortage of physicians
have seldom effected liberalization of license recognition policies,"' there
are some indications that at least the force of reciprocity requirements is
currently yielding to such pressures. Of the forty-nine jurisdictions which
have some provision for recognizing other states' licenses, the licensing
agencies of all but six currently have discretionary authority to endorse li-
tenses issued by non-reciprocating states." 1 Two states have recently
amended their statutes to specify that their reciprocity requirements are
discretionary rather than mandatory.' 2 If this discretion is exercised clearly
and consistently-as, for example, the basis for regulations establishing
conditions under which non-reciprocating states' licenses will be recognized
-the effect of reciprocity may not be so objectionable.
F. Suspension, Revocation, and Reinstatement of Licenses
Legal provisions for disciplinary actions against licensed physicians in-
volve balancing the interest of the public in ethical and competent med-
ical practice, with the interest of physicians in continuing their practice
without unjust interference. Accordingly, state medical practice acts spec-
ify the grounds which must be satisfied for the removal of medical licenses,
and the procedures which must be followed in the enforcement of licensure
criteria."5 3
1. Grounds for License Removal
Statutory grounds for suspension and revocation of medical licenses can
be summarized within three general and somewhat overlapping categor-
ies:'54
150. F. MOTT & M. ROEMER, RURAL HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE 377 (1948).
151. See ENDORSEMENT POLICIES, supra note 60. The six states without discretionary
qualifications of their reciprocity requirements are Alaska, Ark., Ga., La., Nev., and Vt.
152. IowA CODE ANN. § 148.5 (1962); MINN. STAT. § 147.04 (Supp. 1966).
153. It is possible that statutory grounds for suspension or revocation of an existing
license may influence the interpretation of statutory requirements for the issuance of
a new license, especially criteria such as "good moral character." See notes 57-59 supra
and accompanying text. And, in general, the same statutory procedures may be used
by an aggrieved physician to test a licensing agency's initial refusal to license him or
subsequent decision to discipline him. The present section, however, considers both
grounds and procedures only in disciplinary contexts.
154. ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 270 (Supp. 1965); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1401
(Supp. 1967); ARc. STAT. ANN. § 72-613 (Supp. 1967); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 2416-17 (Deering Supp. 1966); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-3 (1964); DEL.
CODE ANN. fit. 24, §§ 1741(a)(7)-(8) (Supp. 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.12(1)
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1. personal disqualifications-physical or mental illness or disability;
drug addiction, alcoholism, gross immorality, etc.;
2. illegal acts-conviction of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude, violation of narcotics laws, performing or procuring or aiding
the performance of an abortion, aiding or abetting an unlicensed person
to practice medicine, fraud in obtaining a license, violations of the licensure
law or of state public health laws and regulations, etc.; and
3. unprofessional conduct-improper advertising, fee-splitting, repre-
senting an incurable condition as curable, conduct likely to deceive or de-
fraud or injure the public, betrayal of a professional secret, habitually neg-
ligent conduct, wilful neglect of a patient, gross malpractice, etc.
Despite some general similarity among disciplinary grounds, there is no
uniformity among the states in either their incidence or their statement.
A 1961 survey, which is still remarkably accurate, found the following
statutory configuration:...
Among the states there are more than 90 reasons for the revocation
or suspension of a medical license. No one ground, stated in the same
words, is to be found in all medical practice acts. Nine grounds are
found repeated in thirty or more state laws. These are: drug addiction
in forty-seven states; unprofessional conduct (whether defined or not)
in forty-five states; fraud in connection with examination or obtaining
a license in forty-four states; alcoholism in forty-two states; advertising
in forty states; abortions in thirty-nine states; conviction of an offense
involving moral turpitude in thirty-six states; and mental incompe-
tence in thirty-two states.
a. general grounds. Complicating this variety are problems of statutory
terminology, and the greatest semantic difficulties arise in connection with
broad, undefined terms such as "unprofessional conduct," "conduct un-
(1) (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-916 (Supp. 1966); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§ 3152 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 145 (Supp. 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
147.19 (Supp. 1966); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8892.1(5) (Supp. 1966); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 71-1,104.01, -1,104.04 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-16 (1963); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 67-5-24 (1953); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6514(2) (d)-(f) (McKinney Supp.
1966); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 43-17-31 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 667.190(10),
677.225 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 410 (Supp. 1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
5-37-4 (Supp. 1966); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-317, -317.1, -317.2 (1967); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 147.20 (l)(g) (1957), 147.225 (Supp. 1967); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §
33-340(1) (1957). See generally MEDICAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, A Study pre-
pared by the Legal Department of the American Medical Association, undated but
distributed as current, November 1, 1966.
155. A.M.A. MEDICAL DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE, REPORT To THE BOARD OF
TRUSTEES 41 (1961). This report was based upon the same statutory survey as MED-
ICAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, supra note 154. For subsequent amendments of the
statutes, see note 154 supra.
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becoming a physician," or "conduct harmful to the public." These terms,
especially "unprofessional conduct," are used in most jurisdictions in either
of two ways: as a generic category under which specific proscribed acts
are listed, with a notation that the category "includes but is not limited to"
the listed acts; or as a final miscellaneous ground following a list of more
specific disciplinary grounds. In either case, the terms constitute vague
catch-als which significantly affect the enforcement of the statutes.
First of all, because of the quasi-criminal nature of disciplinary actions,
some courts may invalidate such statutory terms as unconstitutionally vague,
even in cases of obvious violations:
"Unprofessional or dishonorable conduct," for which the statute au-
thorizes the revocation of a license that has been regularly obtained,
is not defined by the common law, and the words have no common
or generally accepted signification. What conduct may be of either
kind remains, as before, a mere matter of opinion. In the absence of
some specification of acts by the law-making power, which is alone
authorized to establish the standard of honor to be observed by persons
who are permitted to practise the profession of medicine, it must, in
respect of some acts at least, remain a varying one, shifting with the
opinions that may prevail from time to time in the several tribunals
that may be called upon to interpret and enforce the law."'
.... Doubtless all intelligent and fair-minded persons would agree
in the opinion of the board of medical supervisors that the act charged
against the appellant in the case at bar amounted to conduct both
unprofessional and dishonorable. But this is not the test of the validity
of the particular clause of the statute. The underlying question in-
volved in all cases that may arise is whether the courts can uphold and
enforce a statute whose broad and indefinite language may apply
not only to a particular act about which there would be little or no
difference of opinion, but equally to others about which there might
be radical differences, thereby devolving upon the tribunals charged
with the enforcement of the law the exercise of an arbitrary power
of discriminating between the several classes of acts."'
On the other hand, most courts have upheld disciplinary actions based upon
these vague grounds, at least in cases of clear and convincing evidence, by
applying principles of strict and "saving" statutory construction: "I
In the sections of the statutes dealing with the grounds upon which
a license may be revoked, the Legislature has used language specifically
156. Czarra v. Board of Med. Supervisors, 25 App. D.C. 443, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1905).
157. Id. at 453.
158. E.g., In re Mintz, 233 Ore. 441, 378 P.2d 945 (1963). See also "Cases on
Revocation of Physicians' Licenses" (Am. Med. Ass'n, mimeograph, undated); 41
Am. JUR. Physicians & Surgeons § 46 (1938); 70 C.J.S. Physicians & Surgeons § 31
(1951); Annots., 5 A.L.R. 94 (1920), 79 A.L.R. 323 (1932), 163 A.L.R. 909 (1946).
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defining certain of them, or has used words having a reasonably cer-
tain meaning in the law, but it has then added certain general words
such as 'immoral,' 'dishonorable,' or 'unprofessional,' as indicating
the character of conduct which is a ground for revoking a license.
These words in themselves have no significance in law even to a rea-
sonable certainty and might seem to authorize the revocation of a li-
cense for acts having no reasonable relation to the underlying pur-
pose of the statute, the protection of the public. Giving these words
a broad meaning, it would be difficult to justify the grant to the board
of power to revoke a license for any conduct which it might deem to
be immoral, dishonorable, or unprofessional.... But if we did give to
these words so broad a meaning, we would be attributing to the Legis-
lature an intent to vest the board with power going beyond the scope of
its purposes and to enact a law of at least doubtful constitutionality. We
cannot assume that the Legislature intended to give expression to
such an intent and must, if it is reasonably possible to do so, so con-
strue the words it has used as to make the provision a valid and rea-
sonable one .... The words must have been used in the light of the
fundamental purpose of the statutes to regulate the profession in the
public interest and they can only be construed as intending to include
conduct within their fair purport which either shows that the person
guilty of it is intellectually or morally incompetent to practice the pro-
fession or has committed an act or acts of a nature likely to jeopardize
the interest of the public.159
It might be expected that this judicial uneasiness and reluctance to en-
force nebulous terminology would lead the legislatures or the licensing
agencies to promulgate more precise definitions. Instead, however, the
result has been found to be "a fear of litigation" which generally dis-
courages disciplinary actions, except possibly "when a statute is clear or
where the evidence is clear cut."' 60 In other words, judicial principles of
strict construction are adopted by the licensing agencies, which generally
enforce only obvious disciplinary grounds defined in the statutes, or par,
ticularly egregious or even heinous instances of undefined "unprofessional
conduct."' The result is that the disciplinary process of the licensure
statutes protects the public only against relatively infrequent and extreme
offenses."6 2
159. Sage-Allen Co., Inc. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 667, 678-79, 179 A. 195, 199-200
(1935).
160. A.M.A. MEDICAL DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE, supra note 155, at 45, 46.
161. In most states the statutes give the licensing board discretionary authority to
suspend or revoke licenses on the grounds listed. In only a few states does the board
have a statutory "duty" to suspend or revoke licenses; e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 84-916
(Supp. 1966).
162. Compare the reported incidence of various complaints against physicians by the
A.M.A. MEDICAL DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE, supra note 155, at 18, with the grounds
most frequently involved in disciplinary actions, id. at 25.
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This result may well be consistent with policies of limiting licensure laws
to the enforcement of minimal standards, and relying upon the self-disci-
pline of medical associations and institutions for further maintenance of
professional competence. Regardless of questions concerning the feasibility
of these policies,' however, their implementation through administrative
conservatism based upon predicted judicial restriction of vague legislative
phrases seems a curious subversion of the legal process. For the statutes'
general grounds, even those recently enacted, do purport to provide com-
prehensive discipline through the licensure mechanism, with suspension or
revocation justified by:
Any conduct or practice contrary to recognized standards of ethics
of the medical profession or any conduct or practice which does or
might constitute a danger to the health, welfare or safety of the patient
or the public, or any conduct, practice or condition which does or
might impair the ability safely and skillfully to practice medicine.'
b. specific grounds. The statutory definitions of some specific disci-
plinary grounds indicate an intent that licensure criteria be less stringent
than other legal standards to which physicians may be accountable. For
example, while a physician may be civilly liable for malpractice based
upon "ordinary" negligence (failure to exercise the care and skill ordinarily
exercised by other physicians),"' in the fifteen states which list malprac-
tice among grounds for licensure discipline, the standard is usually phrased
as "gross malpractice [or] repeated malpractice or any malpractice" '
"gross malpractice or gross neglect,"1 7 "gross carelessness or manifest in-
capacity,"' 68 or "gross incompetence." 6 The disciplinary criteria are thus
analogous to less stringent criminal standards of gross malpractice, which
are usually included in state penal statutes.
Another aspect of this point is illustrated by some recent developments
regarding license revocation for performing an abortion.Y0 These disci-
163. See generally A.M.A. MEDICAL DISCIPLINARY COMIBITTE, supra note 155.
164. ARuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1401(8)(t) (Supp. 1966).
165. For more complete statement and discussion of the standard applicable to
civil malpractice cases, see Leff, Medical Devices and Paramedical Personnel: A Pre-
liminary Context for Emerging Problems, 1967 WAsit. U.L.Q. 332.
166. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1401(8)(h) (Supp. 1966).
167. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-16(h) (1963).
168. ORE. REv. STAT. § 677.190(19) (1961).
169. R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-37-4(j) (Supp. 1966).
170. For discussion of abortion laws, see Leavy & Kummer, Abortion and the Pop-
pulation Crisis; Therapeutic Abortion and the Law; Some New Approaches, 27 OHIo
ST. L.J. 647, 654 (1966); Roemer, Due Process and Organized Health Services, 79
PUB. I-HEALTH REP. 664, 666 (1964).
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plinary grounds generally incorporate a state's penal provisions governing
abortions. Thus, in most states, where it is a crime to perform an abor-
tion except to save a woman's life, the licensure statute provides for revo-
cation for performance of an "unlawful," "illegal," or "criminal" abor-
tion, or for performance of an abortion except to save a woman's life. In
those states in which the criminal law permits an abortion to preserve
either the life or health of the woman,'7 ' the licensure statute is also in-
terpreted less restrictively. In Oregon, although the criminal statute allows
an abortion only to save a woman's life, the licensure statute provides that
an abortion for a woman whose health is imperiled by the pregnancy, after
consultation with and concurrence of another licensed physician, is not
a ground for suspension or revocation of a medical license." 2 The Oregon
Supreme Court has held that a physician who undertakes such an abor-
tion, with proper consultation, is not subject to criminal prosecution. 7 '
And in Mississippi, even before the 1967 amendment of the abortion law
to permit abortions in cases of rape, the licensure statute had been amended
to exempt a medically indicated abortion from the sanction of revocation. 4
Thus, where criminal standards are more stringent than criteria approved
by the medical profession, there is some tendency for licensure discipline to
follow the latter, which may in turn lead to liberalization of the former.
For many specific disciplinary grounds, however, it is difficult to de-
termine the precise standards, if any, contemplated by the licensure sta-
tutes. The grounds are often inadequately defined, and, although the dif-
ferences may not be reflected in administrative practices, statutory phrase-
ology varies from state to state-for example: "habitual intemperance,"
or addiction to alcohol to such a degree as to render the physician unfit
to practice; "conviction" of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude, or "knowing and wilful commission" of such a criminal act;
"wilful betrayal of a professional secret," or simply "betrayal" of such a
confidence. These interstate differences may be of minor importance in
171. In 1967 Colorado (which previously allowed abortion to preserve health) and
North Carolina amended their abortion laws along the lines of the MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 207.11, (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). CoLo. REv. STAT. § 40-2-50 (1967); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 14-44, -45.1 (1967). California adopted a statute permitting abortions
to preserve a woman's health and in cases of rape and incest. Therapeutic Abortion Act;
CALIF, SEss. LAWS 1967, ch. 327. In all these states, license revocation will now be
authorized only for abortions outside the exceptions set forth in the criminal law.
172. ORE. REv. STAT. § 677.190(2) (1961).
173. State v. Buck, 200 Ore. 87, 262 P.2d 495 (1953). For discussion of this case,
see Leavy & Kummer, supra note 170, at 654.
174. Miss. CODE ANN. § 8893.1(5) (Supp. 1964).
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the discipline of obvious disqualifications and patently unethical practices,
but for some grounds, such as mental incompetency, the differences have
more serious implications.
Some statutory provisions, particularly those recently enacted,' provide
for license suspension or revocation only when a physician evidences mental
illness or mental incompetence "to a degree and of a character which
renders such person unsafe or unreliable as a practitioner,"' 7 6 or when any
physical or mental disability makes further practice dangerous."" Other
statutes, however, make admission to a mental hospital a ground for sus-
pension or revocation without specifying inability to practice. The latter
provisions, by delaying hospitalization, may endanger the physician and
even the public. It seems unreasonable to permit a mentally ill physician
to continue to practice while being treated with medication, but to revoke
his license if he enters a hospital. While he is hospitalized, the physician
is unable to practice medicine in any event. One state provides for auto-
matic suspension of a license in case of voluntary hospitalization exceeding
twenty-five days,7 8 but this exception which permits initial diagnosis or
treatment without suspension still does not relate the suspension to ability
to practice. Another state has a particularly inequitable provision whereby
voluntary admission or commitment to a state hospital creates a license
suspension, while admission to a private mental facility presumably does
not so operate."' While these statutes may be prejudicial to physicians,
other statutes which authorize suspension or revocation only after a court's
adjudication of "insanity" or "incompetency"' 80 may not provide sufficient
protection for the public. Revocation on grounds of mental disability
should be related to the physician's capacity to practice and the safety
175. Aeiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1452D.3 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-613(11)
(Supp. 1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.12(1) (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-916 (Supp.
1966); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1810(k) (1957); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 16a
(1966); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.595(1)(g) (1963); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 112, § 61 (1965); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 630.300, 630.030(15) (1963); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 329:17 (1966); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6514.2(c) (1953); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-14 (1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 516 (1963); ORE. REv. STAT. §
677.225(1)(a) (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 63, § 410 (Supp. 1966); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54-317.1(2) (1967); WASH. RIv. CODE ANN. § 18.72.030(14) (Supp. 1966).
Mental disability grounds are indicated in MEDICAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINOS, supra
note 154. Recent amendments are specially compiled at note 154 supra.
176. ALA. CODE fit. 46, § 270 (Supp. 1965).
177. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 33-340(1)(e) (1959).
178. ORE. REv. STAT.§ 677.225(a) (1961); cf. ORE. REv. STAT. § 677.190(18)
(1961).
179. CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN. act 13, § 13.5 (Deering 1965).
180. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54-317.1(2) (1966).
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of the public. These provisions also must not inhibit proper medical care
for physicians.
Some potential grounds for licensure discipline are conspicuously absent
from the statutes. For example, in no jurisdiction is educational obso-
lescence a ground for suspension or revocation, unless or until manifested
as "unprofessional conduct," "gross malpractice," or, in a few states, "gross
incompetence."'' Also, few states have adjusted their disciplinary grounds
to changes in the organization of medical practice. Only one statute pro-
vides that publication, distribution, and circulation of information con-
cerning physicians by any group organized and existing as a non-profit
insurance plan do not constitute advertising forbidden by the licensure
law.' The latter provision is significant for the development of consumer-
sponsored prepaid health care plans.
2. Procedures for License Removal
a. disciplinary agencies. A few states separately administer the issuance
and suspension or revocation of medical licenses, and delegate disciplinary
authority to agencies other than the licensing board. In five jurisdictions
the courts are given exclusive or concurrent power to suspend or revoke
medical licenses.'83 The state board or department to which the licensing
agency is attached has sole primary jurisdiction for disciplinary actions. 8 '
In some states where the examining board does not issue licenses, but
advises another agency on qualifications for licensure, it, nevertheless, has
the authority to revoke licenses.' In Delaware, disciplinary matters are
delegated to the Medical Council which consists of a judge and two phy-
sicians."8 ' An independent Medical Disciplinary Board is elected by phy-
sicians licensed in Washington.' With these exceptions, disciplinary au-
thority resides in the same agencies responsible for licensing 88
181. Compare the proposal that periodic re-examination and/or regular participa-
tion in continuing education programs be made "requirements for continuing member-
ship in organized medicine and other medical associations." Gunderson, Medical Re-
sponsibilities in a Changing World, 170 J.A.M.A. 280, 282 (1959).
182. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6514-2(d) (McKinney 1961).
183. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 20-5 (1958); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-123, -131
(1966); IOWA CODE § 147.58 (1962); LA. REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 1285 (1950); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 147.20(2) (1957).
184. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 16a (Smith-Hurd 1966); NEB. RaV. STAT. § 71-149
(1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-37-4 (Supp. 1966).
185. ALA. CODE tit. 46, §§ 259, 270 (Supp. 1966); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-605,
-618 (1956).
186. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 1701, 1741 (1953 and Supp. 1966).
187. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 18.72.010, .050 (1961).
188. For the designation and composition of medical licensing agencies, see p. 259
supra.; Appendix 1.
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Most arguments for separate disciplinary administration proceed from
the comprehensive role that the medical licensing boards play in disciplin-
ary actions. The boards may act as promulgators of regulations, investi-
gators of complaints, prosecutors of offenses, triers of fact questions, and
judges of final decisions. This composite role, however, characterizes many
regulatory agencies, and the virtues of such agencies-expertise, experience,
flexibility, perspective-seem especially appropriate for licensing boards.
Even the domination of the boards' memberships by physicians and their
selection by medical societies" 9 enhance rather than handicap their disci-
plinary role; for licensure discipline must, after all, reflect and reinforce
the goals of traditional medical self-discipline:
... (1) to impose a penalty which is just and proper; (2) to develop
measures which will exert a deterrent effect upon others who might
become involved as well as the offender; and (3) to ensure that the
potentialities for rehabilitation are present.'
Indeed, the Medical Disciplinary Committee of the American Medical
Association has recommended that the medical boards consider discipline
their primary function:' 9 '
The committee would suggest that greater emphasis be given to en-
suring competence and observance of law and ethics after licensure.
Agencies already exist which can prepare and correct written exam-
inations to be given applicants for medical licensure. Additionally,
much more reliance can be placed on our medical schools of today....
Thus it may be an appropriate time to re-appraise the primary function
of state medical boards.
.... It is the recommendation of the committee, therefore, that ....
State boards of medical examiners seriously consider the advisability
and necessity of making discipline their primary responsibility ...
b. disciplinary procedures. Especially in light of the extensive powers
of disciplinary agencies, procedural safeguards are important to assure full
protection of individual licensed physicians. Depending upon whether a
license is regarded as a property right or a revocable privilege,' 92 all the
elements of due process may or may not be constitutionally required in
disciplinary proceedings. In most states, however, the licensure statutes
provide a licensee with basic rights to receive a copy of the charges against
189. See pp. 259-61 supra.
190. A.M.A. MEDICAL DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE, supra note 155, at 60.
191. Id. at 55, 68.
192. See F. GRAD, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW MANUAL 62-74 (1965); Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss3/3
LICENSURE OF PHYSICIANS
him and prior notice of any hearing thereon, and to have such a hearing
at which he may be represented by counsel.'' In addition, the omission
of any of these rights from the licensure statutes may be remedied by state
administrative practice acts, where they exist. If these or other rights of
due process are not available for initial administrative proceedings, the
statutes generally provide for appeal and judicial review.'
Under former statutes without guarantees of procedural safeguards, the
courts frequently implied them. It has been held that a licensee is entitled
to judicial review even without statutory authorization, 9 ' that the require-
ment of a hearing implies a requirement of notice, 9 ' and that a statute
is unconstitutional absent a provision for notice and hearing.197 That the
courts still strive to protect licensed physicians' rights is demonstrated by
a recent decision of the California Supreme Court granting the right of
discovery of evidence to physicians charged with "unprofessional conduct"
for having performed hospital-approved therapeutic abortions in cases
of maternal rubella. The court extended the right of discovery to the
administrative hearing before the Board of Medical Examiners, which it
analogized to a criminal proceeding, in order to afford the physicians full
opportunity to prepare their defense.' 98
Alert to protect the rights of individual physicians, the courts have also
been aware of the impact of procedural requirements on protection of the
public. It has been held that a board's decision was not invalid where all
the board members were not physically present to hear the evidence but
instead read the record,' that a jury trial is not constitutionally required for
revocation of a license,2"' and that a trial court was justified in refusing
193. Authorities cited note 154 supra.
194. Authorities cited note 154 supra.
195. Horton v. Clark, 316 Mo. 770, 293 S.W. 362 (1927).
196. Ramsay v. Shelton, 329 Ill. 432, 160 N.E. 769 (1928).
197. Board of Med. Examiners v. Lewis, 149 Ga. 716, 102 S.E. 24 (1920).
198. Shively v. Stewart, 65 Cal. 2d 475, 481-82, 421 P.2d 65, 68, 55 Cal. Rptr.
217, 220 (1966):
The criminal law analogy is appropriate here. The medical board has the re-
sources of the state at its command to enable it to secure complete informa-
tion and to prepare its case before filing an accusation. Since the agency is
the accuser, a party to the proceeding, and ultimately makes a decision on the
record, its concentration of functions calls for procedural safeguards. Petitioners
have been charged with crimes and should have the same opportunity as in crim-
inal prosecutions to prepare their defense. Moreover, when, as in this case, a busy
professional board must be assembled to hear the charges, it is of the utmost im-
portance that full preparation be promoted so that needless continuances can be
avoided.
199. Cooper v. Board of Med. Examiners, 35 Cal. 2d 242, 217 P.2d 630 (1950).
200. State v. Hanson, 201 Iowa 579, 207 N.W. 769 (1926).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
to admit new or additional evidence in mitigation where the evidence
could have been offered at the original hearing.2"'
3. Reinstatement of Removed Licenses
Licensure statutes generally provide for reinstatement of suspended or
revoked licenses upon evidence that the reason for removal of the license
no longer obtains, and that the former practitioner's privilege to practice
may safely be restored." 2 Additional evidence may be required, for ex-
ample, that the physician is of "good moral character" and has not en-
gaged in practice during the period of suspension or revocation. In some
states, in cases of suspension for a definite period of time, reinstatement is
automatic at the expiration of the period. But for indefinite suspension
or revocation, written application for reinstatement is necessary,2"' and
the statutes authorize or require a hearing, an oral or written examina-
tion, or an interview to determine fitness to resume practice. The sta-
tute may allow the board to set terms and conditions for restoration of
a license, but, even without such a provision, all boards have wide dis-
cretion in determining reinstatements.'"
Separate provisions in many states govern reinstatement of licenses re-
moved because of mental disability.205 Generally, two requirements must
be satisfied: (1) removal of any adjudication of mental illness or incom-
petency, and discharge from hospital; and (2) independent judgment by
the board of recovery and ability to practice safely. 2" The latter require-
ment, related to professional competence and public safety, is in accord
with the criteria recommended above for determining removal of licenses
on grounds of mental disability.0
II. OSTEOPATHIC PHYSICIANS
Osteopathy began in 1894 as a drugless, non-surgical system of healing
based on a theory that physical ailments result from misalignment of the
201. Schoenen v. Board of Med. Examiners, 245 A.C.A. 972, 54 Cal. Rptr. 364
(1966).
202. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1452(A) (1) (Supp. 1967); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 67-5-26(B) (1961); Wis. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147.26(2) (1957).
203. E.g., ARIZ REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1452(A)(1) (Supp. 1967); CAL. BUs. &
PROF. CODE § 2376.5 (Deering Supp. 1966).
204. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF, CODE § 2376.5 (Deering Supp. 1966) ; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 67-5-26(C) (1961); Wis. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147.26(2) (1957).
205. Separate reinstatement criteria and procedures especially characterize recently
enacted mental disability provisions. See statutes complied, note 154 supra.
206. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2416 (Deering Supp. 1966); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 67-5-26(A) (1961).
207. See text accompanying notes 177-181 supra.
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musculo-skeletal system. All the original tenets of osteopathy have since
been scientifically disproved, and most have even been rejected by the
osteopathic profession." 8  The five accredited osteopathic colleges-lo-
cated at Chicago, Des Moines, Kansas City, Kirksville, and Philadelphia-
have revised their curricula to virtually eliminate mechanotherapy and
manipulation as subjects of study, and to include scientific medicine, sur-
gery, pharmacology, and other clinical and pre-clinical subjects.209 In
1955 a study committee of the American Medical Association surveyed
the osteopathic colleges and found no evidence that osteopathic courses
interfere with the achievement of a sound medical education. This survey
concluded that "teaching in present-day colleges of osteopathy does not
constitute the teaching of 'cultist' healing."2 x
The transformation of osteopathy from cultist healing to scientific med-
icine is significant because osteopaths comprise more than four per cent
of American medical manpower.2"' The contribution that osteopathic phy-
sicians can make to American medical care depends upon standards en-
acted for their licensure, facilities utilized for their training and practice,
and perhaps, eventually, agreements reached for their integration into the
medical profession.
A. Licensure Provisions
Although osteopathy has made great progress in the direction of scien-
tific medical practice, state licensure statutes for osteopaths retain some
vestiges of its origins as a healing cult. These vestiges may characterize
the scope of functions authorized for licensees, the organization and opera-
tion of licensing agencies, and/or the qualifications required for licensure." 2
All states and the District of Columbia license osteopathic physicians.
Ten states issue licenses for osteopaths to practice only what is taught in
schools of osteopothy, but three of these states permit performance of major
surgery if the osteopath has taken the same qualifying examination as all-
208. 2 W. McNERNY, HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL ECONOMICS 1274 (1962); Northrup,
Perspectives from the Past: Sixty-five Years of Progress, 60 J. Am. OSTEOPATHIC
AsS'N 81 (1960).
209. 2 W. McNERNY, supra note 208, at 1275.
210. A.M.A. COMM. ON OSTEOPATHY & MEDICINE, REPORT (1955), reprinted in
Appointment of Doctors of Osteopathy as Medical Officers, Hearings on H.R. 483 Be-
fore a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Award Services, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, 87
(1956).
211. Of the 305,115 physicians in the United States as of December 31, 1965, the
degree of Doctor of Osteopathy was held by 13,027. 1965 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE, HEALTH RESOURCES STATISTICS 98.
212. See generally Holman, Osteopathy and the Law, 195 J.A.M.A. 283 (1966).
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opathic physicians. 3 In twenty-one states osteopaths are specifically pro-
hibited from performing major surgery or using drugs, but in five of these
states the use of drugs or performance of major surgery is allowed if the
osteopath has completed certain graduate requirements and in three of
these states if he has taken the same qualifying examination as allopathic
physicians.214
In the other twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia, an osteo-
path may obtain an "unlimited" license to practice medicine and surgery
and in nineteen of these states osteopaths take the same qualifying exam-
inations as allopathic physicians.21 Twenty-four states which permit os-
teopaths to use drugs and perform major surgery require completion of
a satisfactory internship.21 In three states osteopaths are examined by
boards containing no osteopathic members.217 In thirty-two states boards
containing only osteopaths examine the qualifications of candidates for
licensure. " s Since the merger of osteopathy and medicine1"' in California,
the osteopathic board gives no new licenses.220 The Board of Medical Exam-
-iners now is the exclusive licensing agency and licenses only M.D.'s."2 ' In
the remaining states the boards can contain M.D.'s and D.O.'s."22
All states require graduation from an acceptable or approved osteopathic
college.23 In general the states rely on the American Osteopathic Asso-
ciation for accreditation of osteopathic schools, but as a matter of practice
some state boards inspect osteopathic schools independently.224 , All the
osteopathic colleges in the United States are approved by the American
Osteopathic Association, and all require high school diplomas and collegiate
education for admission. 25
213. Appendix 3.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3600 (Deering 1960).
220. Id.
221. Id. §§ 2100-2101 (Deering Supp. 1966).
222. Appendix 3.
223. Id.
224. Interview with the Louisiana Board of Osteopathic Examiners.
225. Kisch & Viseltear, Doctors of Medicine and Doctors of Osteopathy in Cali-
fornia: Two Separately Legitimized Medical Professions Face the Problem of Providing
Medical Care, a case study prepared by the U.C.L.A. School of Public Health, and soon
to be published by the Division of Medical Care Administration, U.S. Public Health
Service. In general interstate recognition of osteopathic licenses is based on equivalence
of education. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 681.090 (1961); WASH. REv. Coun ANN.
§ 18.57.130 (1961).
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Federal funding is now available to facilitate the improvement of oste-
opathic colleges, but there is no requirement that these schools must meet
the accreditation standards of the AMA-AAMC Joint Liaison Committee
in order to qualify for federal financial assistance.226
Twelve states require osteopaths, as a condition of renewal of their li-
censes, to furnish evidence of completion of a one- or two-day "refresher"
course.227 These provisions, unique among licensure laws for health per-
sonnel, were enacted at the insistence of state osteopathic associations, which
sponsor refresher programs for practicing osteopaths. Although the spe-
cific requirements are inadequate to keep practitioners abreast of expan-
sions in medical knowledge, the provisions are sound in principle.22 They
should be made at least as strong as any new continuing education require-
ments for medical and surgical physicians,2 2 and perhaps even stronger,
in view of the limitations of osteopathic education and training.22 '
B. Relationship of Osteopaths to Hospitals
Full understanding of the status of osteopaths in the United States re-
quires not only review of the licensure laws but also analysis of the rela-
tionship of osteopaths to hospitals. The latter involves clinical training
of osteopathic students, accreditation of osteopathic hospitals, and osteo-
paths' staff privileges in non-osteopathic hospitals.
1. Facilities for Education and Training
Although the licensure statutes for osteopaths ostensibly require educa-
tional qualifications equivalent to those for M.D.'s,23 the weaknesses of
osteopathic colleges produce significant differences in actual preparation.
Educational limitations of the osteopathic physician may result from (1)
the lack of clinical facilities large enough to provide adequate training and
226. Health Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. §§ 292-292b,
292d-292j, 293-293h, 294-294e (1964).
227. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1825(B) (1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 459.19
(1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 32, § 2703 (1965); MICE. STAT. ANN. § 14.573
(1956); NEV. REv. STAT. § 633.110(3) (1963); N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 67-8-17 (1961);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 43-14-17(2) (1960); OHIo Rv. CODE ANN. § 4731.37
(Page 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 641 (1963); TENN. CODE ANN. 63-908
(Supp. 1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1836 (1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-14-10
(1966).
228. In nearly all the 12 states cited in note 227 supra, attendance at the annual
educational program conducted by the state osteopathic association, or its equivalent,
satisfies the requirement of refresher education.
229. See pp. 276-77 supra.
230. See Section B. infra.
231. See pp. 291-93 supra.
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close enough to osteopathic colleges to permit integrated didactic and clin-
ical education; (2) the shortage of qualified teachers in osteopathic col-
leges; or (3) the inadequacy of postgraduate education for osteopathic
physicians.232 The first factor is primarily a product of the quality and
location of osteopathic hospitals:
Most of the osteopathic hospitals are too small to provide adequate
clinical material and broad undergraduate teaching programs, and
the colleges have been forced to send their students to hospitals that
are widely separated from them geographically: e.g., Chicago College
of Osteopathy makes extensive use of the 400-bed Detroit Osteopathic
Hospital in its undergraduate program. This obviously weakens the
school's contact with its students and could be quite disruptive of the
continuity of the educational program.23 3
The other two factors are closely related to the first. Since osteopathic
colleges are not affiliated with universities or university medical centers,
they offer neither the same resources for clinical training nor the same at-
tractions for faculty as medical schools. The limited number and size of
osteopathic hospitals results in utilizing fewer and smaller hospitals for
internship and residency training than is the case for postgraduate training
of M.D.'s.234 Moreover, in non-osteopathic hospitals, internships and resi-
dencies are awarded first to M.D.'s and then, if places are available, to
D.0OIS. 2 35
2. Hospital Accreditation and Privileges
Once an osteopath is licensed, the most important determinant of his
status is his ability to admit patients to an accredited hospital. Although
osteopathic hospitals may be approved by state licensing agencies and by
the American Osteopathic Association and are eligible for federal construc-
tion grants under the Hill-Burton and Hill-Harris Acts, 3" nevertheless,
only hospitals with combined medical and osteopathic staffs ray be ac-
credited by the Joint Commission on Hospital Accreditation.23 For ac-
credited, non-osteopathic hospitals, staff privileges are commonly made
contingent upon graduation from an approved medical school, or upon
membership in the county medical society. These rules have frequently
been contested in the courts by osteopathic physicians.
232. 2 W. McNERNY, supra note 208, at 1281-82.
233. Id. at 1275-76.
234. Id. at 1278.
235. Id. at 1275-78, 1281-83, 1442.
236. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 et seq. (1964).
237. See Amacav Hosp. Ass'N, Hosp. ACCREDrrAtION RErER2NcES (1964).
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In a recent New York case,238 the right of admission to a county medical
society was denied to an osteopath who was licensed in New York and had
subsequently received an M.D. degree in California after the merger of
medicine and osteopathy there. The court held that the medical society,
in exercising its right to make membership rules not inconsistent with law,
could restrict admission to graduates of medical schools provided there
was no showing of either economic necessity for society membership or
monopolistic practices by the society. This holding is in accordance with
the decisions of most appellate courts which have considered the question.
These courts have generally held that public hospitals may adopt rea-
sonable rules regarding admission to their staffs, and that exclusion of
osteopaths does not constitute arbitrary or discriminatory action. "9
On the other hand, attorneys general in two states have expressed the
opinion that osteopaths are entitled to staff privileges in county hospitals,""'
and a similar result has been reached by the courts of at least three other
states.241 This position is illustrated by two decisions of the New Jersey
State Supreme Court. The first, Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical
Society," 2 involved an osteopath who had been licensed to practice med-
icine and surgery by the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners and
subsequently was awarded an M.D. degree in Milan, Italy, after seven
months' study. Thereafter he served a 16-month, A.M.A.-sponsored in-
ternship in a medical hospital in the United States. As a probationary
member of the county medical society, he had staff privileges at two med-
ical hospitals; but when his probationary membership was revoked, his
staff privileges were automatically terminated because both hospitals re-
quired membership in the county medical society for staff physicians. In
238. Kurk v. Medical Soc'y, 18 N.Y.2d 928, 223 N.E.2d 499, 276 N.Y.S.2d 1007
(1966), af'g 24 App. Div. 2d 897, 264 N.Y.S.2d 85§, rev'g 46 Misc. 2d 790, 260
N.Y.S.2d 520 (1965).
239. Newton v. Board of Comm'rs, 86 Colo. 446, 282 P. 1068 (1929); Richard-
son v. City of Miami, 144 Fla. 294, 198 So. 51 (1940); Lambing v. Board of Comm'rs,
45 Idaho 468, 263 P. 992 (1928); Munroe v. Wall, 66 N.M. 15, 340 P.2d 1069
(1959); Wallington v. Zinn, 146 W.Va. 147, 118 S.E.2d 526 (1961); Duson v. Poage,
318 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Harris v. Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1920).
240. Iowa and Michigan, cited by Holman, supra note 212, at 284.
241. Stribling v. Jolley, 362 Mo. 995, 245 S.W.2d 885, modified, 241 Mo. App. 1123,
253 S.W.2d 519 (1952); Morgan v. State, 155 Neb. 247, 51 N.W.2d 382 (1952);
Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 76 N.J. Super. 149, 183 A.2d 878 (1962), aff'd, 40 N.J.
389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963); Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 62 N.J. Super.
184, 162 A.2d 324 (1960), afl'd, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
242. 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324 (1960), aff'd, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791
(1961).
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his suit to gain admission to the county medical society, the court held that
a medical society cannot refuse membership to an osteopath when the ef-
fect of this refusal is to exclude him from hospital privileges and thus from
the practice for which he was licensed:
The State of New Jersey has determined that it is in the public in-
terest that graduates of the Philadelphia College of Osteopathy who
successfully pass the State Board examination be admitted to the
practice of medicine and surgery in this State. The State of New
Jersey is the appropriate authority for the declaration of public policy
in relation to this field and the same may not lawfully be exercised by
any independent agency.243
The second New Jersey case, Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital,24 involved
an osteopath's application for staff privileges in a private non-profit hos-
pital. A by-law of the hospital requiring staff members to be graduates of
A.M.A.-approved medical schools was held to be unreasonable as applied
to a licensed osteopath.
C. Merger of Osteopathy and Medicine
In California, medicine and osteopathy have been merged. 2" This ac-
complishment is the culmination of many years of effort on the part of the
California Osteopathic Association and the California Medical Associa-
tion to effect a single system of medical practice.2" It suffices here to note
the effects of this merger upon the status of osteopathic physicians and os-
teopathic colleges.
Under the California legislation, osteopathic licenses are no longer is-
sued.4 ' Since 1962 all graduates of the California College of Medicine,
the former osteopathic college, have been awarded M.D. degrees. 4 s All
living licensed graduates of this and other osteopathic schools have also
243. Id. at 207, 162 A.2d at 336-37. Cf. Group Health Ins. v. Howell, 40
N.J. 436, 193 A.2d 103 (1963), discussed in the article by Forgotson, Roemer, and
Newman p. 400 infra, in which a restrictive enabling act for medical care plans was held
to be an unconstitutional delegation of the legislature's licensing power to the state
medical society.
244. 76 N.J. Super. 149, 183 A.2d 878 (1962), aff'd, 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817
(1963).
245. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3600 (Deering 1960).
246. For an historical account of the forces and interests involved in this unique
accomplishment, see Kisch & Viseltear, supra note 225.
247. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3600 (Deering 1960). This section of the Osteo-
pathic Practice Act no longer provides for licensing osteopaths, but states that the
law governing licenses of the Board of Osteopathic Examiners is to be found in the
division of the code relating to the practice of medicine.
248. Kisch & Viseltear, supra note 225.
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been given an M.D. degree, if they would accept it, under a "grandfather"
clause whereby they agreed to cease identifying themselves as osteopaths."'
This procedure merged into the regular medical profession all but 400 of
the 2250 doctors of osteopathy practicing in California.25 The Board of
Medical Examiners is now the licensing agency for all physicians. The
Board of Osteopathic Examiners exists only to monitor the remaining li-
censed osteopaths in the state.2 '
An integral and essential term of the merger was an agreement to trans-
form the California College of Osteopaths into the California College of
Medicine, a regular medical school accredited by the Joint Liaison Com-
mittee on Medical Education.25 For a time after the merger, by agree-
ment between the osteopathic and medical associations, the California Col-
lege of Medicine operated as an independent institution with financial
support from the two professional associations. In 1962 the college became
a medical school of the University of California, and it is now the fully
accredited medical school of the University of California at Irvine.
Another term of the merger agreement related to membership of former
osteopaths in the California Medical Association. It was agreed that the
state medical association would direct its efforts toward admitting former
osteopaths into existing county medical societies. Until such admission
could be accomplished, a special medical society was created as a profes-
sional base for these physicians. 5'
Problems of specialty status and interstate recognition are more difficult
to resolve. Former osteopathic physicians certified as specialists by osteo-
pathic specialty boards are not eligible for certification by medical spe-
cialty boards, since they have not graduated from approved medical schools
or completed approved internships and residencies. The same requirement
of graduation from an approved medical school blocks the recognition by
other states of California medical licenses issued to former osteopaths. 54
Thus, full medical licensure of these osteopathic physicians is operative
only in California.
In the state of Washington, negotiations are under way to effect a merger
of osteopathy and medicine similar to that in California. The Washington
State Board of Medical Examiners has approved an M.D. degree awarded
by an osteopathic college; the Washington State Medical Association voted
249. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2396 (Deering Supp. 1966).
250. Kisch & Viseltear, supra note 225.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See pp. 277-80 supra; note 238 supra and accompanying text.
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in 1967 to merge with those osteopaths who wish to give up sectarian
practice and become part of the medical community devoted to scientific
medical care."' In other states the Committee on Osteopathy and Med-
icine of the American Medical Association is exploring the possibility of
integrating the two professions, but the trend toward merger has not en-
tirely eliminated interprofessional rivalry and resentment. "
III. CHIROPRACTORS AND OTHER CULTISTS
Medical cultism involves the practice of purported "healing" according
to theories or methods which do not have a scientifically accepted founda-
tion.2"7 Although chiropractic is not the only existing cult, it is the only
one which still constitutes a significant hazard to the public. Osteopathy,
which in its origins was similar to chiropractic, has progressively incorpo-
rated the rigors of medical science and is currently being integrated with
scientific medicine."' Homeopathy has also been transformed and merged
into legitimate allopathic medicine. Naturopathy and naprapathy are
rapidly disappearing by attrition. On the other hand, recent estimates
place the number of chiropractors practicing in the United States between
14,360 and 35,000, and the number of patients treated by chiropractors
as high as three million a year."5'
A. The Cult of Chiropractic
Chiropractic had its origin in an alleged cure of deafness by a back-
cracking performed in 1895 by D. D. Palmer, an Iowa grocer and "mag-
netic he;ler."260 Subsequent growth of the cult's dogma and practice has
been narrated so often.6 that it need only be summarized here.
255. A.M.A. News, Jan. 9, 1967, at 9, col. 2.
256. AMxERICAN OSTEOPATHIC ASSOCIATION, A.O.A.-A.M.A. RELATIONSHIPS (un-
dated White Paper).
257. Cultists should be distinguished from religious healers, such as Christian Science
practitioners, who are excepted from the operation of medical licensure laws. Sea
pp. 251-53 supra. This exemption is based upon constitutional freedom of religion and
the legal right of competent adults to refuse medical treatment.
258. See supra p.
259. STANFOaD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CHIROPRACTIC IN CALIFORNIA 3 (1960)
(estimated 25,000 chiropractors in U.S. in 1957); Smith, Chiropractic: Science or
Swindle? 43 TODAy'S HEALTH 56 (1665): "Today chiropractors may be treating
as many as three million people a year for ailments ranging from headaches to can-
cer. . . . The 1960 census listed 14,360 chiropractors in the United States but the
American Chiropractic Association claims there are 25,000 and a public relati6ns firm
for the chiropractors says there are 35,000."
260. A.M.A., CHIROPRACTIC: THE UNsCIENiIO CULT 5 (1966).
261. E.g., A.M.A., supra note 260; BoyD, THE CULT OF CHmRoRAcTia (2d ed. un-
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Chiropractic is represented by its adherents as a complete and inde-
pendent healing art which can prevent and cure all human disease.282 The
basic tenet of chiropractic is that diseases are caused by a dislocation or
"subluxation" of the vertebrae in the spine.263 This "subluxation," it is
alleged, is accompanied by a narrowing of the apertures between the ver-
tebrae, which exerts pressure upon the nerve branches issuing from the
spinal cord, and supposedly results in disease in parts of the body activated
by the pinched nerves. Chiropractic treatment is to reduce the "subluxa-
tion," thereby relieving pressure on the nerves, aiding the return of "nerve
force," and purportedly curing the patient's illness.
Medical authorities unanimously agree that chiropractic has no va-
lidity.2" The cult's theories have never been supported by objective evi-
dence, and they have been thoroughly refuted by medical science. " ' Be-
sides considerable economic consequences, the dangers inherent in this
"healing" cult are twofold. First, chiropractic treatment frequently delays
proper and effective medical care until it is too late.2" Second, chiropractic
treatment often produces actual physical damage to patients."' Ideally,
statutes licensing chiropractors should be repealed to remove the cult's
shield of legitimacy. Realistically, however, since repeal is unlikely in light
dated); DOYLE, SCIENCE VS. CHIROPRACTIC (1953); Smith, supra note 259; Stalvey,
What's New in Chiropractic? 57 N.Y. STATE J. MED. 49 (1959).
262. See England v. State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 246 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. La.
1965), aff'd mem., 384 U.S. 885 (1966).
263. Id. at 995: "There seem to be two schools of chiropractic. The members of
the International Chiropractic Association apparently believe that there is one cause of
disease-subluxation of the vertebrae-and one cure-manipulation of the spine to
relieve the subluxation. The American Chiropractic Association, while not as absolute
in its approach to the problem of disease, nevertheless feels that chiropractic is a com-
plete and independent healing art which not only can prevent disease, but can cure
disease if the manipulation of the spine begins in time."
264. See, e.g., BAYER, MEDICINE MEN AND MEN OF MEDICINE (1940); REED, THE
HEALING CULTS (1932); Statement of Deans of Univ. of Rochester School of Medi-
cine & Dentistry, Cornell Univ. School of Medicine, Albert Einstein College of Medi-
cine, and New York Medical College, presented to the Rules Committee of the New
York State Assembly, Mar. 25, 1963; authorities cited note 261 supra.
265. MEDICAL SOC'Y OF THE STATE OF N.Y., MYTH AND MENACE: THE TRUTH
ABOUT CHIROPRACTIC (1948); authorities cited notes 261, 264 supra.
266. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 259, at 59; Statement of Chief Medical Examiner,
City of New York; President, Medical Soc'y of the County of N.Y.; and Chairman,
Joint Comm. of the N.Y. State Bar Ass'n and the Medical Soc'y of the State of N.Y.,
presented to the Rules Committee of the New York State Assembly, Mar. 25, 1963.
267. See, e.g., A.M.A. DEPT. OF INVESTIGATION, DATA SHEET ON CHIROPRACTIC 3
(1966); BoYD, supra note 261, at 56-57; Marsel, Can Chiropractic Cure? 1946
HYoIENE 6.
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of the power of the chiropractic lobby,2"' suggestions are made here for
improvements in statutory formulation and enforcement. It should be
recognized that no matter how high they are set, no matter how strictly
they are enforced, licensure standards cannot redeem the scientific inva-
lidity of chiropractic. Increased official attention to licensure provisions
can only lend credence to public misconception regarding chiropractors.
B. The Legal Status of Chiropractic
In light of these facts, the only legal issue regarding chiropractic is how
best to protect the public from its dangers. The goal of licensure laws for
health professions and occupations, as previously noted,26 is to permit only
those who are properly qualified by their education, training, and ethics
to provide particular kinds of health care. Mandatory medical licensure
laws have significantly contributed to the elimination of cultism, quackery,
and inferior medical education."' However, there is one paradoxical ex-
ception to this accomplishment-the licensing of chiropractors.
1. Licensure
Among the many triumphs of chiropractic, none is more remarkable
than its achievement of licensure status in all but three states ....
The first licensing act was passed by Kansas in 1913. By 1915, five
states had such laws; by 1925, 32 .... Legislators in most of the re-
maining states, caught between the clear fact of the falsity of chiro-
practic practice and belief and the equally clear fact that chiropractors
enjoyed licensure in more than half of the states, threw up their hands
in embarrassed confusion. Most decided that the lesser evil was to
license the cult and thus at least bring it under regulation."'
The rationale for mandatory licensure of chiropractors, in all states ex-
cept Louisiana and Mississippi, is to limit chiropractors' functions to a
sphere in which they are supposedly qualified, to assure that they meet speci-
fied educational requirements, and otherwise to control their activities. The
following review of selected features of licensure statutes demonstrates that
these goals have not been realized.
268. Illustrative is the most recent enactment of chiropractic licensure in 1963 by
the New York legislature, despite the adamant and unanimous opposition of the educa-
tional, medical, and scientific communities. N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 6550-65 (McKinney
Supp. 1966).
269. See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
270. Id.
271. Smith, supra note 259, at 59.
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a. definitions, scope, and effect. Mandatory licensure statutes provide
varying definitions of the practice of chiropractic. 72 Several statutes de-
scribe the peculiar theories of chiropractic, but most define its practice in
terms of the particular methods used by chiropractors. Although these defi-
nitions differ considerably in specific details, all are generally designed to
confine chiropractors to manual manipulation or mechanical adjustment
of the spinal column and to exclude them from the prescription of drugs,
the performance of surgery, or the administration of other medical therapy.
Some statutes, however, either define or allow chiropractors to practice
chiropractic "as taught in chiropractic schools or colleges"2"' or "in ac-
cordance with the method, thought and practice of chiropractors."2 The
latter phrases, unless restrictively interpreted by licensing boards or by the
courts,2"7 may "open the door to the full practice of medicine except for
major surgery."2 6  Chiropractors have proclaimed their opposition to
definitional constraints upon their practice: 277
There is no special merit in having any single definition of chiropractic,
for any such would tend to straightjacket [sic] the educational proc-
ess .... I would urge avoiding any narrow limiting of the scope and
definition of practice which can only tend to prevent growth and un-
derstanding. At work is the pragmatic factor . . .where the scope
of practice is determined by practitioners in their offices.
Because of this tendency of practicing chiropractors to expand the actual
scope of their functions, a special burden is placed upon state legislatures
to specify prohibited activities,27 and upon state licensing agencies to en-
force such proscriptions." 9
272. See BoyD, supra note 261, at Table 1; A.M.A. DEP'T OF INVESTIGATION, SCOPE
OF CHIROPRACTIC PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (1966).
273. CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN., act 4811, § 6 (Deering 1954); FLA. STAT. § 460.11
(1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 602(b) (Supp. 1966).
274. E.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 66-509 (1947); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-151
(1965).
275. The California courts have held that the scope of chiropractic is not enlarged
by such statutory language. Crees v. Medical Examiners, 213 Cal. App. 2d 195, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 621 (1963); People v. Mangiagli, 97 Cal. App. 2d 935, 218 P.2d 1025 (1950);
People v. Fowler, 32 Cal. App. 2d 737, 84 P.2d 326 (1938). Cf. Ellestad v. Swayze,
15 Wash. 2d 281, 130 P.2d 349 (1942), holding that licensure standards may be more
demanding than training given in chiropractic schools, as long as they have "real and
substantial relation" to the protection of public health and welfare.
276. BovD, supra note 261, at 27.
277. ANDERSON REPORT, ISSUES CONFRONTING THE DELEGATES AND MEMBERS OF
THE AMERICAN CHIROPRACTIC ASSOCIATION AS THEY SEEK TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS
OF CHIROPRACTIC EDUCATION 8, 9-10 (1964).
278. In addition to basic prohibitions of drugs and surgery, one or more licensure
statutes also proscribe the practice of obstetrics, osteopathy, physiotherapy, dentistry,
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In most jurisdictions where they are licensed, chiropractors are permitted
to use the titles of "doctor"2 ' or "physician." '' Some statutes, however,
limit licensees to the title "doctor" or the prefix "Dr.," which must be
accompanied by the words "chiropractor" or "chiropractic" or by the let-
ters "D.C.3282 These titles only increase the possibilities of public confu-
sion created by chiropractic licensure 2 s More particularly, designations of
chiropractors as having achieved doctorate degrees seem to misrepresent
the nature of chiropractic education.
b. educational qualifications. Chiropractic education and training are
appallingly inadequate, as documented by both independent.. and chi-
ropractic 25 studies. There are currently twelve schools of chiropractic
recognized by the two chiropractic associations, but none is accredited
by any agency recognized by the National Commission on Accreditation or
the U.S. Office of Education, and no school has full "accreditation" even
by the American Chiropractic Association or the International Chiro-
practic Association. The faculties of these schools are poorly qualified, and
the ratio of faculty to students is extremely low.2  Admission require-
optometry, or chiropody; the use of X-rays for therapeutic purposes; or the piercing of
tissue for any purposes. See authorities cited note 272 supra. The New York statute
contains a rather comprehensive list, and this statute is also one of the few which
designate certain types of diseases which may not be treated by chiropractic. N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 6558(3) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
279. Since statutory enforcement is notoriously lax in those states in which the
licensing agency is a board of chiropractors, consideration should be given to enforce-
ment by non-chiropractic agencies as a prerequisite for any improvement.
280. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 66-509 (1947), specifyig that licensed chiropractors
"shall be permitted to use the prefix Dr. or Doctor as a title."
281. FLA. STAT. § 460.11(3) (1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-714 (1957); Nyv.
REv. STAT. § 634.120(3) (1963). But see N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-06-11 (Supp. 1967):
"A licensed chiropractor may not use the title physician, or surgeon, but may use the title
doctor of chiropractic, or D.C."
282. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-18 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv.
§ 20-33 (1958); HAwAn Rv. LAws § 60-14 (Supp. 1963); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
65-2885 (1964); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 454 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
45:9-14.5 (1963); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-06-11 (Supp. 1967); VA. CODE ANN. §
54-279 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-16-9 (1966); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 33-142
(1957). Cf. IOWA CODE ANN. § 151.6 (1947); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-1-22 (1953);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-117 (1955), which require chiropractors to identify them-
selves in other ways.
283. See BoYD, supra note 261, at 46-47.
284. Id. at 19-23; Smith, supra note 259, at 59-61; authorities cited infra notes 295,
296.
285. See ANDERSON REPORT, supra note 277, at 32.
286. STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 259; A.M.A. Dep't of Investiga-
tion, Educational Background of Chiropractic School Faculties, 197 J.A.M.A. 999
(1966).
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ments, although also low, are dubiously enforced. A study of actual ad-
mission applications showed that chiropractic schools do not observe their
own admission rules, and admit students with less than high school edu-
cations and questionable credentials.8 7
Licensure statutes which specify educational attainments prior to ad-
mission to chiropractic schools are about evenly divided between require-
ments of high school graduation or its equivalent and requirements of two
years of college .2' For chiropractors, however, perhaps the most significant
licensure requirement is passage of basic science examinations in jurisdic-
tions where they are required. 9 In those states in which the same exam-
inations are given to medical and chiropractic students, and the examina-
tions are uniformly graded by the same board, an average of 81.4 per cent
of all physicians pass their first examination, whereas an average of 84.5
per cent of chiropractors fail."' Chiropractic students show improved per-
formance on examinations separately administered and graded by boards
of chiropractors,2 1 so that, nationally, about a third of them pass this test
of non-clinical scientific knowledge. 92 However, basic science require-
ments, like other licensure standards, may be subverted through licensure
by interstate reciprocity between "tough" and "easy" jurisdictions.293 Sim-
ilarly, since chiropractic licensure is entirely a 20th century creation, a
substantial number of chiropractors are insulated from such standards by
"grandfather" clauses which exempt chiropractors already (and usually
illegally) in practice when licensure statutes were passed. 4
287. A.M.A. Dep't of Investigation, Special Report: Requirements for Admission
to Schools of Chiropractic, 190 J.A.M.A. 763 (1964).
288. A high school diploma or its equivalent is required by the statutes of Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York (until 1968), Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont. Two years of approved college is the statutory
requirement in Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine,
Montana, New Jersey, New York (after 1968), North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The statutes of
Georgia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Utah require either one year of college or college
credits in specified courses. See A.M.A. DEP'T OF INVESTIGATION, SCOPE OF CHIRO-
PRACTIC PRACTICE IN TnE UNITED STATES (1966).
289. Cf. p. 268 supra.
290. Such comparative data may no longer be available if the American Chiro-
practic Association succeeds in its efforts to prevent identification of the schools from
which examination applicants come. Smith, supra note 259, at 59.
291. Accordingly, the International Chiropractic Association is attempting to pre-
vent the same boards from grading the examinations of medical and chiropractic stu-
dents. Id.
292. DOYLE, supra note 261, at 10.
293. See Smith, supra note 259, at 59-60.
294. Id. at 59.
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c. alternate licensure. The experience of the last half-century with at-
tempts to control chiropractic through licensure laws leads to the conclusion
that more effective safeguards are needed."' The Louisiana Medical Prac-
tice Act may well serve as a model. Basically, the Louisiana licensure sta-
tute prohibits the practice of chiropractic unless the practitioner is also
a medical doctor.29 This requirement provides a more effective safeguard
than licensure of chiropractors because it assures that the practitioner will
possess the education and training necessary to understand his diagnosis
and prescribed therapy in terms of medical principles as well as those of
chiropractic. Medical education and training should be required of ad-
herents to chiropractic because:
There should be no such thing as limited education and training when
one is dealing with human illness. You cannot limit the extent to
which a disease process or an ailment will affect the human body. The
person who assumes the responsibility for treating human beings must
be prepared to treat the whole person. He must be qualified to pro-
vide the care of the whole person. He cannot restrict himself to just
one system of treatment; he must employ all techniques that will be
of benefit to the patient."'
2. Other Regulation and Recognition
A few courts have held that chiropractors must satisfy medical standards
of performance:
If a person undertakes to cure those who search for health and who
are, because of their plight, more or less susceptible of following the
advice of any one who claims the knowledge and means to heal, he
cannot escape the consequence of his gross ignorance of accepted and
established remedies and methods for the treatment of diseases .... 298
Chiropractors may also be subject to the same state and municipal public
health regulations which apply to physicians. Most chiropractic licensure
statutes so provide, and require or permit licensed chiropractors to execute
295. For example, although chiropractors were not licensed by New York until
1963, over 3,000 were illegally practicing in the state as of 1957. Stalvey, supra note
261, at 56. See also MEDICAL SOC'Y OF THE STATE OF N.Y., supra note 265.
296. "There is no special statute covering chiropractic [in Louisiana] . . . . [Pjersons
desiring to practice chiropractic in the State of Louisiana must qualify under the pro.
visions of the Medical Practice Act." England v. State Bd. of Mcd. Examiners,
246 F. Supp. 993, 995 (E.D. La. 1965), aff'd mem., 384 U.S. 885 (1966). The refusal
of the Louisiana legislature to provide special licensure for chiropractors has been sus-
tained against constitutional objections. Id. at 997.
297. Stalvey, supra note 261, at 58.
298. Gian-Guriso v. State, 180 So. 2d 396, 398 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965), quoting
State v. Heins, 144 Fla. 272, 275, 197 So. 787, 788 (1940).
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various health reports and certificates.' 99 These provisions usually include
death certificates, and four states specifically include birth certificates.'
On the other hand, chiropractors are prohibited by statute from signing
birth certificates in Tennessee,3"' birth or death certificates in Maryland,"0 2
and any reports or certificates in New Jersey.'' Although most statutes
do not deal with hospital privileges, the North Carolina statute gives li-
censed chiropractors access to public hospitals,"0 4 and in North Dakota
these licensees "may practice in any public or private hospital or other in-
stitution ...when requested so to do by any patient or the guardian of
any patient."'0 5
Chiropractic has achieved an impressive array of other legal and official
recognitions. For example, federal funds are available to chiropractic stu-
dents and practitioners under programs established by the Social Security
Act (but not "Medicare" or "Medicaid"), the U.S. Employee's Compen-
sation Act, and the G.I. Bills of Rights." 6 In addition, the United States
Bureau of the Budget classifies chiropractic as one of the four major heal-
ing professions; the United States Immigration Service admits foreign chi-
ropractic students outside of quotas; the Selective Service Act has permitted
the deferment of chiropractic students; 0 7 and the Internal Revenue Service
permits income tax deductions for chiropractic fees.' 8 Chiropractic serv-
ices qualify for indemnification under most state workmen's compensation
acts and under a great many insurance policies.' 9 These official recog-
nitions of chiropractic tend to promote chiropractic rather than limit its
scope and effect, which is the premise of licensure. The basic assumption of
licensure of chiropractors--that licensure facilities regulation-should be
re-examined.
299. See generally A.M.A. DEP'T OF INVESTIGATION, SCOPE OF CHIROPRACTIC
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (1966).
300. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 66-508 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-06-16(2)
(1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 684.030 (1965); S.D. CODE § 27.0508 (Supp. 1960).
301. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-415 (1955).
302. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 510 (1957).
303. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-14.5 (1963).
304. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 90-153 (1965). The same right of access to public sup-
ported institutions is granted by the South Carolina State Board of Chiropractic Exam-
iners, Rules and Regulations § 17.
305. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-06-17 (1960).
306. Stalvey, supra note 261, at 57.
307. Id.
308. Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 307; I.T. 3598, 1943 Cum. BULL. 157.
309. Stalvey, supra note 261, at 57.
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CONCLUSIONS
Licensure laws clearly affect the quality of medical care by physicians.
By setting minimum qualifications for entrance into the medical profes-
sion, these laws affect educational curricula, approval of educational in-
stitutions and programs of graduate education, delegation of responsibil-
ities to allied and auxiliary personnel, geographic mobility, and substantive
and procedural rules governing actions for violation of these minimum
standards.
This study of licensure laws affecting physicians, osteopaths, and chi-
ropractors indicates, among other things, that:
1. Current statutory provisions impose constraints on medical school
curricular innovations;
2. Specific statutory requirements restrain needed developments in
graduate medical education, such as elimination of the internship
as a separate entity and substitution therefor of appropriate pro-
grams of graduate medical education integrated with undergraduate
medical education;
3. Initial licensure examination requirements of the states do not mea-
sure many of the qualities relevant to fitness to practice and are not
necessarily relevant to current goals of undergraduate medical edu-
cation;
4. Legal requirements for programs in continuing medical education
to prevent educational obsolescence are absent;
5. Incomplete interstate recognition of medical licenses results in bar-
riers to geographic mobility of physicians;
6. Licensure requirements for foreign medical graduates are not gen-
erally geared specifically to fitness to practice high quality American
medicine;
7. Delegation of tasks to allied and auxiliary personnel is governed
by statutes which may be restrictive, ambiguous, or unrelated to
accepted custom and usage;
8. Statutory interpretations relevant to delegations of tasks by physi-
cians to allied and auxiliary personnel are not always based on the
realities of modern medical care;
9. Osteopaths cannot, under present laws, be integrated fully into the
practice of medicine so as to permit their addition to the pool of
physician manpower; and
10. Attempts to control unscientific schools of practice or cultism by
licensure can endanger the public by giving unscientific schools,
such as chiropractic, protection through the sanction of law.
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Resolution of these problems will require legislative, rather than judicial,
action. Judicial action permits resolution of problems only on a case by
case basis, with decisions limited to the facts and circumstances of each
case. Since licensure laws are quasi-criminal in nature, judicial decisions
in these cases are unlikely to result in the establishment of broad principles
which would transcend the immediate facts before the courts.
The legislative process, however, can establish broad principles. It can
consider facts, evidence, and social policy without the procedural limita-
tions of the judicial process. Moreover, it can delegate many interpretative
functions to the administrative process in which the tribunals have both
expertise and flexibility.
Among the many problems presented by the medical licensure laws,
without question, the issue of delegation of tasks is a highly significant, if
not the most significant, problem requiring resolution. It involves not
only the medical profession, but also nursing and other allied and auxiliary
professions and occupations. Solution of the problem of delegation will
require consideration of the legal regulation and scope of functions of all
the professions and occupations comprising the manpower matrix render-
ing personal health care. If the legal authority affecting the functions of
physicians and other health professions and occupations is amended, the
composition of the official licensing agency and its relation to other agencies
of government must be reconsidered. Careful study, analysis, and con-
sultation among the health professions will be necessary to develop guide-
lines for legislative resolution of the issue of delegation and other problems
in licensure.
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